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 The purpose of this thesis is to answer the question 
of how effective are current theater engagement / security 
cooperation plans at supporting US national interests. The 
examination of effectiveness focused on two theaters as 
case studies during the years 1998 through September 2001. 
This examination divided effectiveness down into two parts. 
The first part was consistency. Consistency was 
investigated by a comparison of the national priorities to 
completed engagement activities. The second part of 
effectiveness attempted to measure gains produced through 
the executed engagement missions. 
 Following the case study analysis, key principles for 
effectiveness are identified and a modified engagement 
planning process proposed. The key elements of the modified 
process are integrated interagency planning, objective 
based engagement activities, and synchronization of all the 
elements of statecraft. This framework is tested by 
applying the modified TEP process to a sub-region of 
Africa. The significance for this test is not only to 
demonstrate the capability of the proposed TEP process. 
This test demonstrates the potential for effective 
engagement to assist in prosecuting the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT).  
 In conclusion, this thesis provides an understanding 
of what engagement is today, and what engagement should be 
in the future. The principles of effective engagement 
planning identified herein should provide a framework for 
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American leadership and engagement in the world 
are vital for our security1 




Following the collapse of the Soviet Union the world 
became far less stable. In reference to eastern Europe 
alone, one political analyst commented, “the Soviet 
collapse has left behind significant and unbalanced 
military forces and weapons inventories among nations 
experiencing a wave of instability and conflict generated 
by virulent nationalism”.2 Residual imbalances and ethnic 
conflicts re-emerged throughout the world. In response to 
the growing instability, the importance of global 
engagement became a priority for US national leadership.  
In the 1991 National Security Strategy, President Bush 
initiated the US emphasis on global peacetime engagement.  
It then took primacy with President Clinton’s 1995 National 
Security Strategy, A National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement. The concept of regional / 
global engagement is continuing to evolve and it has 
recently been re-titled Defense and Security Cooperation. 
The National Military Strategy of 1997 embraced a ‘shaping’ 
                     1 Bill Clinton, 1997 US National Security Strategy,  (White House, 
May 1997). 
  1
2 Ronald D. Asmus, “Building a New NATO,” The Shape of World Politics 
(1997) 264. 
philosophy as one of its pillars in its three-pillar 
defense strategy of “shape,” “respond,” and “prepare”.3 
Global engagement includes the application of all four 
elements of US national power: diplomatic, military, 
economic, and information. One established definition of 
peacetime engagement is:  
Interagency activities of the U.S. Government, 
either unilateral or undertaken in cooperation 
with other national or non-nation state entities, 
to influence international conditions in such a 
manner as to protect or advance U.S. national 
interests abroad.4 
For the purposes of this thesis, engagement activities 
include: all preplanned and long term efforts to establish 
and improve military, diplomatic, informational and 
economic ties with other nations to shape the world 
environment favorable for US national interests. This 
thesis endeavors to analyze one critical aspect of those 
peacetime activities, the engagement of special operations 
forces (SOF) abroad. 
This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of the previous 
theater engagement plans and activities of both Special 
Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) and Special Operations 
Command Pacific (SOCPAC) from 1998 through September 11, 
2001. Following the analysis, the two cases are compared 
and principles are identified that most contributed to 
effectiveness. With these principles identified, a modified 
engagement planning process is proposed and tested.  
                     3 John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy, (Washington, 
D.C., 1997). 
  2
4 Hy Rothstein, Regional Engagement: A Concept Paper, (Research 
Planning Inc., 1999).  
B.  BACKGROUND 
The concept of peacetime engagement is nothing new. 
Following World War II the United States was committed to 
being the proactive leader of the world for the prevention 
of future conflict.  No longer could the US avoid foreign 
entanglements. Many organizations and programs were 
established to create interaction and stabilization. The 
epitome of such an organization was the United Nations, 
whose charter states, “United for a better world”.5 All 
elements of US national power have contributed to shaping 
the global environment for our betterment. Examples for 
each of the elements of statecraft include:  
• The United States Military’s forward deployed 
forces and military exchange programs (military).  
• The Department of Commerce and its programs such 
as the African Growth and Opportunity Act 
(economic). 
• the Department of State’s network of embassies 
and missions abroad (diplomatic).  
• Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty 
(informational). 
However, it is the interaction with foreign militaries 
that possesses the greatest potential for regional 
influence and stability. This potential was acknowledged in 
a recent Washington Post article describing the shift in 
international influence from the State Department to the 
military. The article highlights Pakistani President’s, 
Pervez Musharraf, relationship with the US government 
following his military coup and rise to power. Instead of 
communicating with President Clinton or Secretary of State 
                     
  3
5 “United Nations Charter” [http://www.un.org/ 
aboutun/charter/index.html] (27 November 2002). 
Madeline Albright, he chose to contact General Anthony C. 
Zinni commander of Central Command to explain his coup.6 
Coalition exercises with NATO forces to improve 
interoperability and strengthen professional relationships 
resulted in huge gains for the US during Desert Shield / 
Desert Storm, and Northern / Southern Watch.7  The 
Department of State (DoS) acknowledges the military’s 
importance to and influence on international relations by 
organizing and funding several military-to-military 
programs. Examples of such programs include: International 
Military Education and Training (IMET); Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF); and Enhanced International Peacekeeping 
Capabilities (EIPC) training. Additionally, the Department 
of Defense (DoD) also funds its own programs such as: 
Section 1004 Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities; 
non-Security Assistance Unified Command engagement 
activities (junior officer exchanges, Subject Matter Expert 
Exchanges, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff Exercise program). 
There are also a variety of other miscellaneous DoD and 
DoS, funded activities such as Regional Programs (e.g. 
African Crisis Response Initiative), Regional Education 
Centers (e.g. Asia-Pacific Center, Marshall Center, Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, and African Center for 
Strategic Studies), and the Joint Combined Exchange 
Training (JCET) program.8  
                     6 Dana Priest, “A Four-Star Foreign Policy?”, Washington Post, 
September 28, 2000, p A01. 
7 Ralph R. Steinke and Brian L. Tarbet, “Theater Engagement Plans: A 
Strategic Tool or a Waste of Time?,” Parameters, Spring 2000, p70. 
  4
8 Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of 
Interest, Volume I Joint Report to Congress, March 1, 2000. 
As a participant in many of these activities, SOF has 
always been a primary military-to-military engagement tool. 
Army Special Forces (SF), created in December 1951, was 
formed with a corps consisting of nearly half Lodge Bill 
troops.9  The Lodge Bill (Public Law 597) provided a means 
for resident aliens to earn their citizenship quicker by 
volunteering for military service. These new US-patriated 
soldiers were quickly trained in unconventional warfare and 
re-deployed to their ethnic homelands on SF A-detachments. 
Their focus was to prepare for the perceived forthcoming 
war with the Soviets. If war broke out they planned to 
train, organize, and lead guerrilla operations behind 
Soviet lines. They prepared for this mission in peacetime 
by training with Allied militaries on unconventional 
warfare. Thus, almost from its outset, SF has been engaging 
with foreign militaries, influencing their actions and 
developing their capabilities in support of US security. 
From this small scale beginning, SF has become the military 
engagement tool with the largest “footprint”.10 This 
description of SOF having the largest overall ‘footprint’ 
abroad correlates with SOF having the largest influence as 
well. COL Jim Welsh, USMC, from the Office of the Secretary 
of Defense on Strategy, has said that the benefit produced 
by SOF engagement is by far the, “most bang for the buck.”11  
Other members of the SOF community have become active 
in engagement activities as well. According to deployment 
                     9 Susan Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special 
Operations, (1997), p 11.  
10 Interview between CAPT Kevin Johnson, PACOM J56 and author January 
24, 2003. 
  5
11 Interview between COL Jim Welsh, OSD Strategy, and author January 
23, 2003. 
reports maintained at the Special Operations Command 
(SOCOM) Headquarters, all elements of SOF are contributing. 
Although Army SOF elements execute the bulk of deployments 
abroad, 67.3% of them, Navy and Air Force SOF have become 
increasingly significant contributors to engagement, 
executing approximately 16.8% and 15% respectively of all 
deployments.12    
Two key factors have led to SOF use as the primary 
military engagement tool. First, SOF language capabilities 
and cultural understanding, unconventional warfare tactics, 
and operational versatility, all have made SOF the “force 
of choice”.13 SOCOM’s historian explains the reason for SOF 
receiving this title: 
SOF were capable of operating in all politico-
military environments, skilled at peacetime 
training, foreign internal defense, and nation 
assistance operations as well as full-blown 
conventional warfare. SOF’s versatility was 
particularly useful in areas where political 
constraints prevented using conventional forces.14   
Second, sustaining the necessary skill sets and regional 
expertise requires consistent employment in the respective 
theaters and potential areas of conflict. In almost a 
symbiotic relationship, the need to deploy SOF units due to 
their skills was welcomed by the SOF community that sought 
to deploy to maintain those skills. 
The unconventional manner in which these forces have 
operated highlights their potential for high leverage 
influence. Unconventional in that SOF execute missions in a 
                     12 SOCOM deployment data for 1998-2001. 
13 USSOCOM History, McDill AFB, FL, April 2002, p17. 
  6
14 Ibid. 
very diffuse manner with little or no supervision. They 
deploy teams of three to twelve men at a time to train with 
foreign units of six to eight hundred. From 1998-2001, SOF 
elements were deployed to about 150 countries with an 
average of 4800 personnel deployed per year. A peak was 
achieved in 1999 with 5,141 personnel deployed abroad.15 
Conservatively, nearly one quarter of a million foreign 
military personnel can be estimated to have been trained or 
influenced that year by US SOF.16 If one compares that to 
the fact there are only about 4000 US State Department 
Foreign Service officers deployed abroad who only interact 
with a similar number of their diplomatic counterparts, the 
influence SOF can have becomes apparent.17  
Beyond the operational advantages to using SOF for 
engagement, there are also financial incentives. A quick 
look at only one of the many SOF missions, the JCET, 
underscores these fiscal advantages. The JCET was 
authorized by section 10, subsection 2011 of the US Code. 
This legal authorization allows SOF forces to deploy abroad 
to enhance their unconventional warfare skills, and 
language and cultural orientation.  According to John Rudy 
and Ivan Eland of the CATO Institute, in ”FY97 there were 
231 deployments in 100 countries.” The cost of all 1997 
JCET deployments was only $15.2 million (not including 
transportation costs).18 This can be compared to a typical 
                     15 Ibid. 
16 The estimate is based on taking the number of people deployed 5141 
divided by an average of 12 men per deployment giving an estimate of 
428 separate missions that years. Multiply that times an average unit 
they would work with consisting of 600 men gives an estimate of 257,050 
foreign troops trained. 
17 Rudy, J. & Eland, I, “Special Operations Military training abroad 
and Its Dangers”, Foreign Policy Briefing #53, 22 June 1999, p.5. 
  7
18 Ibid, p3. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) exercise. A JCS exercise takes 
place overseas as well, and involves the training of US and 
foreign forces. A typical biannual exercise called 
FLINTLOCK is scheduled to take place in South Africa at a 
cost of $6.1 million.19 Comparatively, this JCS exercise 
affects one country and costs $6.1 million while an annual 
JCET program that has 231 separate SOF exercises in 100 
countries costs a total of 15.2 million. The leverage of 
the JCET program is arguably much higher compared to the 
JCS exercise. Still, there is a second reason for the 
popularity of JCETs. JCETs are funded by SOCOM through 
SOCOM’s own Major Funding Program 11 budget. Thus, the 
Theater Commander can bring SOF into his theater without 
using his own limited resources and budget. 
SOF activities in support of theater engagement plans 
are many and extremely varied. As LTC Cox, former SOJ-5 of 
SOCEUR, puts it, “They (engagement activities) include all 
planned and unplanned activities”.20  Obviously everything 
that SOF does overseas is not driven by engagement, nor 
should engagements benefits be expected from every 
deployment. To clarify the governing characteristics of 
engagement I use the following graphic.  
                     19 “Exercises European Command” [http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
military/ ops/ex-eucom.htm], 15 August 2002. 
  8
20 Personal communication with LTC Cox, ESOJ5 SOCEUR, and the author 
30 May 2002. 
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Figure 1.   Characteristics of Engagement 
 
For the SOF community, five activity areas exhibit the 
characteristics of: preplanned, long term effort, 
bi/multilateral, and focused on regional US interests. They 
are JCETs, Counter-Drug (CD), Security Assistance 
operations (SA), Humanitarian De-mining Operations (HDO), 
and Subject Matter Expert Exchanges (SMEE). Counter-Drug 
operations are missions designed to improve a host nation’s 
ability to fight the criminal drug industry within its own 
borders. Security Assistance programs are funded through 
the State Department to develop a training cadre in host 
nations. These training cadres could be used for anything 
from fielding of US weapons sold to a country to creating a 
regional peacekeeping force. An excellent example of the 
latter was the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). 
ACRI trained regional forces in Africa to conduct peace 
keeping operations in order to avoid US involvement. HDO 
are also consistent with this train-the-trainer concept in 
that they are designed to train a host nation cadre on de-
mining operations. Finally, SMEE involve military-to-
military contact designed to share expertise, develop 
professional relationships, and foster mutual appreciation.    
  9
 These five activities clearly demonstrate the core 
characteristics of engagement as illustrated in Figure 1. 
There are many other operations that are not engagement 
activities by design, but later evolve to become major 
engagement opportunities. Examples of such emergent 
operations include Bosnia and Operation Focused Relief 
(OFR) in West Africa. Both operations started as responses 
to a crisis; Serbian offensive operations and the Sierra 
Leone civil war respectively. Both evolved into a long term 
commitment of training, diplomatic exchanges, and a 
protracted US presence to help shape the region. Once these 
US operations made this transition and became preplanned 
activities, these operations changes from crisis response 
to engagement activities. 
Due to the nature of the US government bureaucracy, it 
is easy to infer a poor degree of coordination and 
synchronization in engagement activities. One would expect 
the opposite to be true of SOF engagement strategies. 
Because SOF elements are small, versatile, and well trained 
one would expect the character of SOF engagement strategies 
to be well synchronized. However, this is not the case. Bob 
Andrews, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 
Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict (SOLIC) 
referred to SOF engagement planning with a joke. He mused 
that SOF planners, when tasked with engagement planning, 
look to each other and state, “I thought you handled 
that.”21 When questioned about coordination regarding 
prioritizing countries for engagement, LTC Cox commented 
that it wasn’t until after 9/11 that SOCEUR synchronized 
                     
  10
21 Robert Andrews, OSD SO/LIC, address to Naval Postgraduate School, 
SOLIC Curriculum, 21 November, 2002. 
with its headquarters, European Command (EUCOM).22 Given 
this, how could SOCEUR’s actions possibly have been well 
synchronized with those of the Pentagon, the President, or 
the interagency domain of Washington, D.C. if they weren’t 
synchronized within EUCOM’s own headquarters? Also, SOF 
planners never connect the regional objectives to the 
activities executed. Serving as both the assistant and the 
primary operations officer in a SF battalion, I can 
personally attest that not one JCET or other peacetime 
engagement deployment order included any operational or 




The need for an effective engagement strategy has 
never been greater.  With the United States fully committed 
to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and operations in the 
Middle East, every mission executed by our forces must have 
a purpose.  As Professor Gordon McCormick of the Naval 
Postgraduate School has suggested, the transnational threat 
posed by Al-Qaida is in essence a type of global 
insurgency.23 As such, a list of actions and requirements 
can be created for the employment of SOF abroad to aid in 
this protracted politico-military conflict. Yet, the orders 
issued to SOF forces deploying abroad include no taskings 
to conduct intelligence or operational preparation of 
future battlefields. However, if the requirements 
identified to fight the GWOT are overlaid on an effective 
                     22 Personal communications between LTC Cox, ESOJ-5, and the author, 
30 May 2002. 
  11
Theater Engagement Plan (TEP) process, the long-term 
strategy to fight transnational terrorism can be advanced. 
 If the United States is to destroy this current 
threat without creating future ones through the arbitrary 
use of force, high-resolution intelligence is required. 
This intelligence preparation of the battlefield must first 
focus on generating accurate area assessments. These area 
assessments must encompass a fundamental understanding of 
the regional populations. Following this foundation of 
regional expertise, information collection can then focus 
on specific targets. As General Wesley K. Clark (Ret.) 
asserts, “…the real key to effective operations will be 
information about the terrorists: details about their 
identities, locations, habits, logistics and aims… 
predictive in nature… best gained by well-positioned 
observers.”24 This employment and placement of operators 
lies at the heart of an effective engagement strategy and 
strategy to defeat terrorists organizations with global 
reach.   
The benefits of having such detailed intelligence are 
enormous. What must be highlighted is the fact that not 
only can these forces employed abroad acquire the raw 
information; they are also capable of discretely 
interdicting select targets. They can operate in a 
politically sensitive way unilaterally or combined with a 
host nation military that was trained through effective 
engagement activities. More importantly, with good  
                     23 Gordon McCormick, Professor at Naval Postgraduate School, Lecture 
on International Terrorism, 2002. 
  12
24 Wesley K. Clark, “Waging the New War,” How did This Happen?, 2001. 
information and intelligence provided by SOF, host nation 
forces can execute their own operations with US assistance 
only as required. 
Maintaining effective military-to-military contacts 
among both conventional and Special Operations Forces has 
already been beneficial during the first round of the GWOT 
in Afghanistan. It was due to military-to-military contacts 
established by the JCET program that the US was able to 
secure basing support in Uzbekistan to conduct combat 
operations into Afghanistan.25 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis employs the congruence case study 
approach. In essence, the characteristics of SOCEUR’s and 
SOCPAC’s engagement planning and activities are evaluated 
for effectiveness, and then compared to one another. By 
comparing the two outcomes, a list of the most effective 
engagement planning principles are identified.  
Effectiveness is defined as meeting two requirements. 
The first is consistency. To obtain a measure of 
consistency, a ratio is derived by comparing the number of 
missions completed in countries identified as of primary 
importance by the President in the NSS to the number of 
missions executed in countries not identified. The analysis 
will only look at preplanned exercises and training events 
so a SOC is not penalized for having been directed to 
execute an unscheduled mission in a non-priority country. 
The second component of effectiveness is output. To place a 
value on the products of the executed engagement missions, 
                     25 Robert Andrews, OSD SO/LIC, address to Naval Postgraduate School, 
SO/LIC Curriculum, 21 November 2002. 
  13
 
all products of completed engagement missions must be 
screened against the standard requirements identified both 
by doctrine contained in Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Manual (CJCSM) 3113.01A and relevant national and theater 
level directives. If a particular case study accomplished 
all assigned engagement tasks and produced results 
beneficial to US regional security objectives, it was at 
least partially effective. 
The principles identified as most effective become the 
foundation for a modified Theater Engagement Planning (TEP) 
process. In some instances, a complete failure in both 
organizations existed in dealing with certain TEP 
challenges. Therefore, new concepts are proposed to fill 
the voids.  
This modified TEP process is then used in an 
illustrative case: Africa.  This case is a test of the 
proposed methodology using a hypothetical scenario. But, it 
also demonstrates the importance an effective engagement 
strategy can have on the Global War on Terror (GWOT) as 
well as on regional stability. The reason for using Africa 
as the test is because of the future importance of Africa 
in the GWOT.  The presence of Al-Qaida operatives in Africa 
is indisputable following the US embassy bombings in Kenya 
and Tanzania in 1998. However, their presence isn’t limited 
to offensive operations alone. Al-Qaida is using Africa to 
traffic arms, and establish training bases, as well as to 
generate and launder funds for future operations through  
  14
the illegal diamond trade.26 The better our engagement 
strategy is in Africa the less freedom of maneuver Al-Qaida 
will have in the future. 
 As noted earlier, changes to engagement strategies 
following September 11 are not included. New engagement 
strategies have not had sufficient time to develop and, 
consequently, testing their effectiveness is not possible. 
However, the principles identified herein as necessary to 
create effective SOF engagement plans should be timeless.  
                     
  15
26 Douglas Farah, “Report Says Africans Harbored Al-Qaeda; Terror 
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II. DOCTRINAL TEMPLATE 
A. ESTABLISHING A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
The rationale for a national security strategy based 
on engagement has coalesced into its current form from a 
unique concept called the democratic peace hypothesis. Its 
premise is that democratic states do not go to war against 
each other.  Historical statistics supports this claim.  
 
Figure 2.   Wars involving democratic and non-
democratic states27 
Figure 3.   Intensity of conflicts between states28 
                     27 Rudolph J. Rummel, The Democractic Peace, University of Hawaii, 
[http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills], 19 January 03, Tab 1.  
  17
28 Ibid, Tab3.1. 
 These tables clearly show the logic behind the 
democratic peace hypothesis and consequently the engagement 
concept. Therefore, exporting and supporting democracy 
throughout the world appears a rational policy to promote 
international peace. There is some academic debate over the 
attributes within democratic societies which foster peace. 
As one political scientist contends: 
[Non-democratic states] lack the internal 
safeguards which assist in maintaining 
international peace. Institutions enabling 
leaders to maintain control by restricting or 
eliminating independent initiatives also restrict 
independent efforts towards defusing potential 
conflict.29 
Other political scientists argue it is the common set of 
democratic norms shared between like countries that act to 
stabilize international relations. Still others insist it 
is the democratic fostered economic interdependence, which 
makes war too costly. Regardless of the cause and effect 
relationships at play, following the Cold War, an 
understandable national security policy decision was made 
to replace the containment policy with one that exported 
democracy.  
B. OPERATIONALIZING THE NEW POLICY 
To implement this policy, a program of global 
engagement was necessary. Engagement slowly and awkwardly 
emerged as the new US strategy and was initially 
highlighted by President George H.W. Bush in his 1991 
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National Security Strategy (NSS). President Bush sets forth 
in this document a commitment to “enlarge the commonwealth 
of free nations that share a commitment to democracy”.30 As 
mentioned in Chapter I, engagement was solidified as the US 
strategy in President Bill Clinton’s 1995 NSS, Engagement 
and Enlargement. This title exemplifies Clinton’s tying the 
policy to enlarge the community of democratic nations with 
the strategy of accomplishing this through global 
engagement.  
However, as was also described earlier, engagement is 
not a new phenomenon.  Many government agencies, including 
the military, were involved with countries throughout the 
world prior to a formally established engagement strategy. 
The era of the Cold War and Super Power positioning drove 
many government agencies to counter Soviet influence. For 
the military, these activities focused on interoperability 
and intelligence sharing to prepare for a possible war 
against the Soviets.  
The so-called ‘peace’ following the Cold War gave rise 
to hope for peacetime dividend. The peace dividend was to 
come from the reallocation of funds away from the 
Department of Defense. No single large threat loomed on its 
horizon and America wanted to capitalize by downsizing the 
military. The reduction of DoD’s budget was initiated by 
President Bush in 1991 and continued under President 
Clinton. The following chart reflects the budget trend. As 
one can see, DoD’s budget has been declining. From the fall 
of the Soviet Union in 1990 through 2001 there has been a  
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7.5% drop in the overall percentage of Federal outlays 
(obligated funds) for the DoD and a 5.3% drop in Net public 




































Figure 4.   DoD Portion of the Federal Budget31 
  
At the same time that the policy of engagement gained 
prominence, the military’s operational tempo (OPTEMPO) 
increased. According to Texas Representative Larry Combest, 
the Army’s deployment tempo increased 300% during the 
1990s.32 As for Special Operations Forces, according to a 
General Accounting Office report to Congress, “(a) 
questionnaire from almost 200 senior-level officers and 
enlisted personnel in SOF units indicated that they believe 
the deployments of SOF units have increased to the point 
that SOF readiness has been, or threatens to be, 
degraded”.33 The three converging conditions of a shrinking 
budget, increasing OPTEMPO, and increasing emphasis on 
                     31 National Defense Budget Estimates for FY 2003, OSD Comptroller, 
March 2002, pp2-6-217. 
32 Rep. Larry Combest, press release, 22 October 2000.  
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engaging abroad led to the development of engagement plans. 
By formalizing how the military would engage, the hope was 
that the efforts would be synergized, producing better 
results with limited resources. That requirement to produce 
Theater Engagement Plans (TEP) remains today. 
The formalizing of the TEP requirement came from a 
series of important documents that were either written or 
updated to reflect the new vision. The updating of these 
documents and the effect they had are a good example of how 
US Defense policy is still created today. The National 
Defense Authorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-201, 
Sections 921-926, requires DoD to conduct a Quadrennial 
Defense Review and report it to Congress.  The purpose of 
the review is to, “include a comprehensive examination of 
the defense strategy, force structure,… with a view toward 
determining and expressing the defense strategy of the 
United States and establishing a revised defense program.”34 
This review is to be completed at the beginning of the term 
of a new presidential administration. The first QDR was 
completed in 1997 and then-Secretary of Defense Cohen laid 
the groundwork for implementing a strategy of engagement 
and enlargement. Cohen stated: 
…the U.S. military and the Department of Defense 
must be able to help shape the international 
security environment in ways favorable to U.S. 
interests… These three elements - shaping, 
responding, and preparing - define the essence of 
U.S. defense strategy between now and 2015.35 
                     33 GAO Letter Report, “Special Operations Forces: Opportunities to 
Preclude Overuse and Misuse NSIAD-97-85”, 15 May 1997. 
34 Public Law 104-201, Section 923, Subparagraph a. 
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The report goes on to define ‘shaping’ as a means to 
prevent aggression, foster relationships, and stabilize 
regions through engagement.36 
The first necessary update to a standing strategy was 
to the National Military Strategy (NMS). Following the 
publication in May 1997 of the QDR, the NMS was updated and 
published in September 1997. The NMS is an important 
document for it “recommends military foundations and 
strategic principles to support national security 
objectives” looking 2-8 years ahead.37 GEN Shalikashvili 
reaffirmed the direction described in the QDR, reiterating 
the three-tiered approach: shape, prepare, and respond. In 
essence, this document raised engagement to the level of 
being America’s first layer of defense in our nation’s 
defense-in-depth strategy.  
From these two strategic policy documents came written 
guidance and plans issued to the Regional Commanders. They 
informed the Regional Commanders of their theater 
engagement responsibilities, regional objectives, and 
priorities. The first critical document came from the 
Secretary of Defense’s (SECDEF) office, and was entitled 
the Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). This document is 
the means by which the SECDEF influences the prioritization 
and overall strategy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and 
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). With the CPG, 
the SEDEF establishes the Prioritized Regional Objectives 
(PROs) which  were  then copied into the JSCP’s Annex E. It 
                     36 Ibid 
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37  John Pike, “Defense Policy,” [http://www.globalsecurity.org/ 
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is the JSCP that actually tasked the theater commanders to 
create a TEP. This tasking to produce TEPs remains in the 
JSCP today.  
The JSCP is a TOP SECRET document distributed only to 
senior staffs and the Regional Combatant Commanders. It is 
a standing document focusing on the near term (next two 
years); it is reviewed annually and updated as needed.38 The 
following flow chart captures the sequence of events and 
the relationship between documents.      
  
 
QDR / NMS 
CJCSM 3113.01A 
CPG JSCP TEP PROs Annex E- PROs
Guidance 
Direction QDR / NMS 
Figure 5.   DoD Strategy Flow Chart 
 
Finally, a manual was created to provide the structure 
and guidelines to prepare a TEP. The Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(JCS) produced the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 
(CJCSM) 3113.01A Theater Engagement Planning. It was first 
issued in 1998 and then updated in 2001.  
C. THE PERSCRIBED ENGAGEMENT PLANNING PROCESS 
The JCS manual 3110.01A describes a four phase process 
for developing a TEP. Each separate Theater staff varies in 
its planning process while still striving to achieve the 
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same prescribed endstate. It is these variations in 
planning methodologies that have the most dramatic effects 
on the outcome and success of engagement activities. It is 
the effective variances between the two cases that I will 
examine shortly. 
The four phases of the TEP development process used 
from 1998-2001 are: Initiation, Strategic Concept 
Development, Activity Development, and Plan Review.39 The 
process strives to synchronize the efforts of the joint US 
military, the interagency community and the participating 
host nations. However, the effectiveness of this process at 
synchronizing efforts is questionable, and will be 
addressed throughout this study. In the end, the TEP 
process must provide a framework for all military forces 
and agencies involved to plan their participation in 
engagement activities aligned with the regional objectives.   
Important to all aspects of engagement abroad is 
funding. The TEP process has therefore aligned itself with 
the Planning and Program Budgeting System (PPBS). It is 
estimated that there are approximately thirty-seven 
different funding channels involved in support of the 
different activities.40 The planning process must be well 
synchronized to ensure that the various agencies involved 
have enough time to properly plan for the use of so many 
different sources of funds. Also, the timing of this 
process must allow for the proper planning and development 
by the host nations involved in these operations. CDR Cline 
from PACOM’s staff (J561) emphasized the importance that a 
                     39 Ibid. 
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JCS exercise may have to a host country’s military program. 
Due to limited resources; it may be their only major 
training event for the year.41 As such, it is in their best 
interest to maximize the event and they will require a 
great deal of preparation time to do just that.  
The SOC, in supporting the TEP process, is also 
heavily tied to the planning schedule. As a supporting 
command, its input must be timed to support the TEP 
process. To accomplish this, it must time internal 
activities that will ultimately affect the input the SOC 
provides to the TEP process. An example of this is the 
timing of the JCET scheduling conference. Because JCETs 
factor so heavily in theater engagement, the scheduling of 
upcoming JCETs should be completed before the TEP process 
can conclude. The following consolidated timeline attempts 
to capture the process. 
 
Figure 6.    TEP Planning Timeline 
 
                     41 CDR Cline’s, USPACOM, presentation at PACOM Interagency and 
Country Team Theater Security Cooperation Working Group, 21 January 
2003. 
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Phase 1: The Initiation Phase begins with the receipt 
and review of the pertinent national documents. At this 
point, Theater Staffs and the SOCs conduct an assessment of 
the previous year’s activities and their effectiveness. 
This assessment becomes part of the Strategic Concept that 
is submitted to, and is used by, the Joint Staff (JS) to 
assess overall military success in shaping the global 
environment.42 Then, the standing Theater’s Strategic 
Concept for Engagement is reviewed in light of the newly 
issued national guidance and strategic objectives.  
Phase 2: This is the Strategic Concept Development 
phase. During odd numbered years each Regional Commander is 
required to submit an updated Strategic Concept for 
engagement to the JS. After review by the JS and the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (USDP) it is integrated 
into the Global Family of Strategic Concepts. The process 
by which the Strategic Concept is derived is through 
mission analysis by the Theater Staff. The Theater Staff 
analyzes the PROs issued in the JSCP and reviews the 
national guidance issued in the NSS, NMS, and CPG. They 
then link the PROs to the Regional Commanders own vision 
and objectives. The Strategic Concept is completed through 
a deliberate planning process incorporating intelligence, 
input from the resident political military advisor (a DoS 
representative), and staffing with all affected forces. The 
document fits a template provided in CJCSM 3113.01A in 
Annex C. At this point, the Theater staff then issues 
guidance to the supporting commands, including the SOC, so 
they can initiate planning of activities in accordance with 
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the Strategic Concept. The Strategic Concept is submitted 
in the odd numbered year to the JS by 1 April for review. 
Phase 3: This is the most challenging phase and it 
focuses on what is called the Activity Annex. The Activity 
Annex along with the Strategic Concept and the Regional 
Assessment completes the TEP. The Activity Annex is a 
listing of all planned engagement activities linked to the 
PROs that they attempt to satisfy. This truly is when 
collaboration takes place. All aligned supporting commands 
that operate in a given theater contribute to this list 
with activities they plan to execute within the theater.  
Their activities are designed to support the Regional 
Commander’s goals while also attempting to meet their 
unit’s training needs. It is here that the SOCs contribute 
to the theater engagement plan as well as satisfy their own 
training requirements. 
In accordance with the prescribed outline provided in 
3113.01A, each Regional Commander must provide this list of 
all engagement activities that will take place for the next 
fiscal year and the activities programmed for an additional 
seven years. At a minimum, the required activities listed 
are: operational activities, combined exercises, security 
assistance, combined training, combined education, military 
contacts, and humanitarian assistance. Part of the specific 
information required to complete the annex includes support 
requirements of forces and transportation.   
The heart and soul of effective engagement resides 
within this portion of the plan.  The desired endstate is 
an Activity Annex that synchronizes the Regional Commanders 
vision both vertically up with the NSS and horizontally 
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among supporting units and other government agencies. The 
Activity Annex must be submitted by 1 Oct annually. 
Phase 4: This phase is the review of the complete TEP.  
The JS, supporting Services, and the USDP review the 
complete TEP. The review process is lengthy and contains 
many cycles of reviewing and editing. When complete, each 
Theater Engagement Plan becomes part of the Global Family 
of Theater Engagement Plans. What is interesting to note in 
this process is what the plans are reviewed for. The 
complete TEPs are reviewed for adequacy and feasibility. 
The CJCS manual defines adequacy as, “whether the scope and 
concept of planned activities are capable of satisfying the 
JSCP-taskings”.43 To determine feasibility, the Joint Staff 
simply evaluates whether the available resources are 
present to execute the proposed plan.  Therefore, the plans 
are not reviewed how they are expected to shape the region. 
It is also interesting to note that the review process can 
take up to sixty days to complete. This means that the TEP 
may not be approved for up to sixty days into the execution 
year.  
D.  KEY ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS  
At this point, it is important to identify areas of 
concern about the process for producing TEPs. Theater 
staffs, by having conducted many evolutions of TEP 
planning, have developed their own unique methods for 
attempting to cope with the challenges and weakness 
inherent in the TEP process.  At this point, it is 
important to note these concerns regarding the process. 
After my analysis of TEP effectiveness is complete, I will 
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measure how well each staff’s unique methods performed 
against the following TEP challenges. 
The first challenge with TEP planning is how to 
generate unity of effort. Nothing is required of the 
Theater staffs by the CJSCM to affect Unity of Effort. 
There are many reasons why this is a challenge. All four 
elements of national power are involved in engagement, and 
many publish and work from their own regional strategies. 
Therefore, they are all not unified on the objectives to be 
obtained regionally. Also, within the insular world of 
planning staffs, it becomes easy to focus solely on the 
concerns of immediate supervisors. Meanwhile the Theater 
staffs must meet the challenge of unifying the overall 
effort by working closely with government agencies and 
attempting to incorporate unit training requirements into a 
cohesive engagement plan.  
For the SOCs, the challenge to create unity of effort 
is even greater because each SOC works under an additional 
two layers of command. The message the US is trying to send 
regionally seems to become ever more distorted the more 
layers of command that are involved. The best example of 
this was the deployment of SOF on JCETs to Colombia in 1996 
and 1997 after President Clinton prohibited military 
support programs to the country.44 Each Theater SOC must 
attempt to comply with the vision of the President, 
Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, Regional Commander, as well as the command guidance 
of the Commander, Special Operations Command (SOCOM). While 
deconflicting all of those inputs, Theater SOCs must also 
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attempt to meet the training needs and desires of the SOF 
units who will actually be deployed and execute the 
missions. SOCPAC being issued three separate lists of 
priority engagement countries is an excellent example of 
conflicting guidance. At the most recent PACOM Theater 
Security Cooperation Working Group conference, a SOCPAC 
briefer noted the difficultly in satisfying the SECDEF, the 
Regional Commander, and SOCOM. All three had issued 
separate lists of priority engagement countries.  
Obviously, any tool that helps unify the effort with all 
the conflicting guidance would be of tremendous benefit.   
The second challenge in the TEP process involves the 
synchronization of activities. The synchronization of the 
regional TEPs takes place in two steps. First, 
synchronization is supposed to happen during the plan 
development process which incorporates the Theater Staff, 
embassy teams, and representatives from OGAs. The second 
step is when each TEP is integrated into the Global Family 
of Plans, reviewed and approved by the CJCS. However, in 
reality true integration really only takes place at the 
embassy level.45 Actual decision-making authority to execute 
missions, approve security assistance sales and training, 
or coordinate senior-level officer visits rests with the 
Ambassador and his staff. The challenge at the Theater 
Staffs is to plan and synchronize activities for commanders 
while working with embassy teams to ensure the TEP also 
supports the vision and objects of each embassy Mission 
Performance Plan (MPP). 
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Each embassy produces a MPP at the direction of the 
Ambassador. This is then forwarded to the appropriate 
regional desk at the State Department. Each regional desk 
then produces a Regional Performance Plan (RPP). The 
consequence is that, the two primary engagement arms of the 
US government – DoD and DoS - are working regionally on two 
separate plans. To make matters worse, DoD and DoS divide 
the world up differently in terms of regions. Therefore, 
some countries considered by the military to belong to the 
European region belong to the Middle East according to the 
State Department (e.g. Syria).46  
The third challenge lies in assessing the previous 
year’s activities and developing measures of effectiveness 
(MOE). According to CDR Cline (J561) from PACOM, this 
challenge has not yet been solved.47 The regional objectives 
of stability, democratization, and access are long term and 
broad objectives, for which MOEs may not be possible. But, 
without an MOE, charting an efficient course for the future 
is problematic. As noted earlier, resources for engagement 
activities are finite and diminishing. Therefore, important 
decisions must be made about how to reinforce success and 
eliminate projects that do not appear productive. Thus, the 
challenge lies in developing objectives and supporting 
tasks that can have MOEs. Once measurable objectives and 
supporting tasks are established, tools such as a database 
system can be employed. A database tool such as the TEPMIS 
                     46 Publicly released Unified Command Plan map dated 30 April 2002, 
[http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Apr2002/020417-D-6570-003.jpg] 
compared to the Near Eastern Affairs country list on the DoS Near-
eastern Affairs website http://www.state.gov/p/nea/. 
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database could then effectively be used to support decision 
makers in charting engagement progress and strategy. 
With this understanding of the engagement planning 
process and its inherent challenges it is time to evaluate 





III. CASE STUDIES  
A.  SOCPAC CASE STUDY 
 
Figure 7.   Regional Commander’s AORs 
 
1. Area Orientation 
The Pacific Command (PACOM) is responsible for the 
largest designated theater of all the Regional Commands. 
SOCPAC as a supporting command of PACOM has the same Area 
of Responsibility (AOR), which covers more than fifty 
percent of the earth’s surface and includes sixty percent 
of its population. One of the keys to understanding the 
complexity PACOM and SOCPAC face when planning engagement 
is that the world’s six largest militaries all operate 
within the region: People’s Republic of China, United 
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States, Russia, India, North Korea, and South Korea.48 
Exacerbating the geographic challenge and military climate 
is the unique bilateral nature of diplomacy in this area. 
There are no multilateral agreements existing within the 
region that include the US and two or more Pacific region 
countries. This has had a dramatic effect on coordinating 
multilateral exercises and events for engagement. 
Individual agreements must be worked out with each 
participating country. Also, long-standing animosities and 
geopolitical power struggles prevent the inclusion of 
certain countries in combined events. These countries, that 
may be independently friendly to the US, such as China and 
Taiwan, will not participate simultaneously in a US-
sponsored exercise. Both, also, refuse to participate in 
military-to-military conferences held at the Asia Pacific 
Center for Security Studies (APCSS). 
 SOCPAC, meanwhile, is a subordinate unified command 
co-located with PACOM at Camp Smith, Hawaii. “SOCPAC 
conducts theater special operations; exercises OPCON of in-
theater and apportioned SOF; and is executive agent for all 
special operations, less CA/PSYOP”.49 Assigned forces 
stationed in-theater consist of the 1st Special Forces (SF) 
Battalion, 1st SF Group in Okinawa; the 353 Air Force 
Special Operations Group consisting of three squadrons; the 
320th Special Tactics Squadron in Japan, and Naval Special 
Warfare Unit 1 in Guam.50 In addition to the in-theater 
                     48 USPACOM Official Website, [www.pacom.mil/about/pacom.shtml], 13 
February 2003. 
49 Special Operation Forces Reference Manual, Joint Special 
Operations Forces Institute, January 1998, p. 2-6. 
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assets, SOCPAC is apportioned by the JSCP support from the 
entire 1st SFG, and SEAL Teams 1, 3, and 5.  
Organizationally, SOCPAC does not differ much from 
that depicted below on the standard SOC organizational 
chart. For PACOM, the J56 staff plans and coordinates 
theater engagement. The staff issues the approved 
engagement strategy and consolidates the subunified 
command’s Activity Matrixes. However, SOCPAC doesn’t have 
the manpower to dedicate an entire section to engagement 
planning alone. Instead, there are designated individuals 
who are tasked to consolidate the SOCs lists of activities 
and submit them to PACOM’s J56. Ultimately, it is the SOJ3, 
the senior operations officer, who finalizes the different 
activity lists and the countries SOF elements deploy to.  
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Figure 8.   Standard SOC Organizational Chart 
 
2. SOCPACs Methodology 
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PACOM and SOCPAC’s TEP planning is prescribed by 
USCINCPAC Instruction 3010.7. This PACOM instruction 
governs the TEP process and the responsibilities of 
apportioned forces. PACOM takes the requirements and 
formats dictated by CJCSM 3113.01A and amplifies them into 
a complete planning process. PACOM’s TEP planning process 
fulfills the CJCS requirements through a series of 
iterative Engagement Working Groups (EWG) and Pacific 
Engagement Synchronization Steering Groups (PESSG). These 
composite groups are designed to integrate all military and 
government agencies involved in the theater into the 
planning process. The idea is to systematize a method for 
creating synchronized plans.  
The EWG is composed of elements from all service 
components, sub-unified commands, and standing JTFs. 
Invitations also go out to country teams, and government 
agencies with regional desks for the PACOM area. During the 
most recent conduct of a PACOM Engagement Working Group, 
representatives from the Department of State to the Corps 
of Engineers were present. This essentially creates a 
composite staff designed to provide information and support 
in the construction of the TEP during the four separate 
phases of the process. 
The PESSG is the senior level review group. Its 
membership consists of the deputy commanders of the 
component commands, sub-unified commands, and standing 
JTFs. The PESSG reviews the draft products of the EWG and 
provides guidance and directs improvements to these 
documents before they are forwarded to the Regional 
Commander for approval. 
As discussed in Chapter II, there are three areas that 
truly challenge the planning staff while it develops its 
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TEP. The methods each staff uses to deal with these 
challenges will, ultimately, affect not only the TEP but 
its effectiveness. Comparatively, I will chart the methods 
each staff used and what effect they produced during the 
case study years. The methods that yielded the best results 
will then be further developed as principles for 
implementation in future TEP planning. Again, the three 
challenges are to: achieve unity of effort, synchronize 
engagement activities, and measure effectiveness. 
From 1998-2001, PACOM tackled the issue of unity of 
effort by offering a simple vision of the purpose for 
engagement in a commander’s intent statement. The intent 
statement remained the same from the case study period 
through today.51 This intent is to engage with countries to 
provide the access and relationships needed to support the 
critical standing PACOM Operational Plans (OPLANS).52 What 
is key is that engagement is regarded as a means to prepare 
and support the execution of OPLANS. The development of a 
host nation’s military capability and addressing 
humanitarian needs are considered secondary. Because this 
intent statement was clear and specific it seemed to lend a 
purpose to the planning process. In essence, it declared 
that an engagement focus on supporting OPLANS moves the US 
in the general direction of its stated regional objectives. 
As the statistics will demonstrate, the engagement effort 
was well focused on the directed priority countries. 
The methodology adopted for synchronizing activities 
and preventing resources from being wasted was the 
                     51 Interview between 1LT Chris Murphy, J56 US Pacific Command and the 
author 23 January 2003. 
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previously-mentioned interagency working and steering group 
system. The intent of this system was to address the issues 
and concerns of all executors of activities (SOCPAC, etc) 
to include the hosts of executed activities (Host Nations, 
Country Teams). It is, however, important to note that a 
critical weakness in the process is that the resulting TEP 
is only a military strategy and not an interagency one. No 
matter how carefully prepared, the TEP can really only 
synchronize military activities. Because the plan is 
binding only on military forces, other agencies are free to 
act as they see fit potentially creating a flawed 
implementation of US engagement strategy. Also, even though 
federal agencies, most notably the State Department, may 
leave the conferences in general agreement they might not 
support the TEP implementation. In the end, this system 
only ensures de-confliction and moderate coordination. 
Meanwhile, because the two primary actors in regional 
engagement operate off of two separate plans, true 
synchronization is unlikely to take place. 
A second tool directed by the CJCSM to assist with 
synchronization is called the Theater Engagement Planning 
Management Information System (TEPMIS). The CJCSM directed 
that this database system be fielded and operational by 1 
October 2001.53 This system catalogs activities planned and 
executed, and attempts to link them to the JCSP regional 
objectives.  During Phase One of the TEP process, 
evaluations can be entered into the TEPMIS so all 
interested parties can monitor the effects of all 
engagement activities. Since this system applies to both  
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SOCPAC and SOCEUR equally, and because it became available 
so late in the case study period, I do not include it in 
the evaluation. 
PACOM dealt with the third challenge of measuring 
effectiveness by subdividing the PROs. PACOM broke the 
objectives down into supporting tasks which they called 
engagement requirements. USCINPACINST 3010.7 states,  
The country chapters (of the TEP) explicitly 
provides engagement planners with the desired 
endstate, mid-term (typically five to eight 
years) objectives that support the endstate, and 
shorter-term (typically one to three year) 
engagement requirements that will support 
attainment of the objective.54  
Unfortunately, what is not clearly defined is how to know 
when these engagement requirements have been met. It is 
also unclear whether these requirements have ever been 
explicitly tasked to the executing unit of an engagement 
activity. If they have not been, then this subdivision of 
the PROs is just an administrative drill without any 
benefit.  
 Foreign countries often make the task of measuring 
engagement effectiveness even more difficult. During 
exchange training with SOF forces, some countries rotate 
units in and out of training with US forces. This prevents 
progression in instruction because the basics must be re-
taught to each new unit which rotates into the training. 
MAJ Ian Rice, a SOCPAC Army component assistant operations 
officer during the time period under study, noted some 
frustration with this problem. He recalled that with the 
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Thailand forces, the same subject of rifle marksmanship was 
taught over and over for several years.  
With this understanding of SOCPAC’s methodology it is 
time to look at which countries in the region were 
prioritized by the President. This will allow us to conduct 
the evaluation of the methodology we just explored and 
determine its effectiveness. 
3. Engagement Priorities 
The National Security Strategies from 1997 through 
2000 were examined to determine the engagement priorities 
during the case study years of 1998-2001. Because the NSS 
was published mid to late each year, each publication 
tended to affect the following year’s engagement plan. For 
the purposes of this evaluation, identification of priority 
engagement countries was done by analysis of the NSS 
documents without influence or input from the theater level 
documents. 
The NSS has been accused of being too broad in focus 
to provide effective guidance. As mentioned in Chapter II, 
the NSS is supplemented by the Secretary of Defense and the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who provide more 
specific military guidance and objectives in the JSCP and 
CPG.  However, it is still the NSS that is the genesis for 
the TEP process. Therefore, to truly evaluate how 
consistent each SOC has been in executing engagement 
activities that supported national priorities, one must 
start with the top national document. The following table 







1998 1999 2000 2001 
Australia Australia Australia Australia 
Brunei Brunei China China 
China Burma Japan Japan 






Malaysia Japan Singapore Singapore 
Philippines Laos Taiwan Taiwan 
Republic Of 
Korea Malaysia Thailand Thailand 
Singapore Philippines     
Taiwan 
Republic Of 
Korea     
Thailand Singapore     
Vietnam Thailand     
  Vietnam     
Table 1.   NSS Prioritized Countries 1998-2001 for 
Pacific Region55 
 
This list was derived from the Regional Strategies 
section of the NSS documents. If the country was mentioned 
by name for the US to be involved with for mutual security 
and stabilization or the like, it is listed as a priority 
country. Furthermore, the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) was listed as an important regional 
organization with which the US wanted to maintain close 
ties with in all four NSSs. However, if a country was not 
mentioned by name, it was not consider an engagement 
priority for that year. 
4. Analysis of SOCPAC Effectiveness 
The first component of effectiveness as discussed in 
Chapter I is consistency. Consistencies is measured by 
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calculating the number of recorded SOCPAC man-weeks 
dedicated to the countries identified above in a given 
year, and then compare that figure to the total number of 
man-weeks SOCPAC deployed forces abroad in the same year. 
The result is a percentage that I refer to as the 
consistency ratio. The report from SOCOM listing the 
deployment man-weeks during the case study period broke 
mission-types into three categories: training, exercise, 
and operational. Since the characteristics that define 
engagement activities are preplanned, long term, 
multilateral, and focused on regional US interests; 
operational deployment data was not evaluated. This focused 
the results of this evaluation on activities that best met 
the criteria for engagement activities. Below is a table 
depicting the results. 
 
Year 






Table 2.   SOCPAC Consistency Ratios56 
 
The average consistency ratio is %76.5. Although this 
is a less than perfect ratio, SOCPAC has managed to keep 
the majority of its engagement activities well focused. If 
the operational data was included SOCPAC’s average would 
have dropped down to %61.07. The negative effect of 
operational deployment data highlights the fact that, in 
many cases, operational deployments are not characteristic 
of good engagement activities. This is most true when they 
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are last minute emergent operations or responses to a 
crisis. Yet operational deployments take precedence, 
especially during a crisis, over training and exercises. 
When such a crisis occurs it forces the cancellation of 
planned engagement activities. Therefore, with an ever 
increasing operational demand, and thus, less available 
resources for engagement activities, the consistency ratio 
of the limited activities must improve. 
The second aspect of the evaluation of engagement 
effectiveness is the qualitative gains achieved from the 
executed activities. According to USASOC regulations, the 
only substantive requirement placed on SOF elements to add 
to the national security following a deployment is the 
completion of a Special Operations Debriefing and Retrieval 
System (SODARS) report. Therefore, the following is a 
discussion on the only tangible item that can be measured 
for this portion of the evaluation. As will be discussed 
later in the thesis, this is part of the problem in 
obtaining desired results from engagement activities. If no 
directed tasks are given for accomplishment during a 
deployment nothing of substance can be expected.  
The SODARs is supposed to capture important 
information about the area of operations where the mission 
was conducted and about the foreign nationals that were 
involved. These reports are archived by the US Special 
Operation Command and indexed both physically as well as 
electronically on the Secret Internet Protocol Router 
Network (SIPER net).  This report could be an extremely 
valuable resource. However, it is a passive document, 
written matter of fact, and it covers only the activities 
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of the deployment.  No taskings for specific information 
collection are given and no thought given to how to develop 
an intelligence picture of that region based on the 
mission. Since the greater military community cannot 
request certain information be acquired during a mission 
and reported in the SODARS, there are no interested 
consumers in the reports. According to the SIPER net web 
site, which counts the number of visits to that site, since 
April of 2000 only 49 people have visited and or requested 
SODARS reports on the Pacific Command countries. 
In summary, PACOM/SOCPAC’s TEP process addresses the 
unity of effort and synchronization well, as demonstrated 
by SOCPAC’s consistency ratio. However, PACOM/SOCPAC failed 
to truly establish an effective way of tasking or measuring 
aggregate gains produced during engagement activities. The 
subdivision of the PROs down to engagement requirements 
never translated into specific tasks issued to units for 
accomplishment. SOCPAC also never required any additional 
output from redeploying SOF units beyond the SODARs 
debriefing report. Therefore, we can conclude that 
engagement missions were being executed more for their own 
sake than to contribute toward some long-term US regional 
objective, thus defying their ultimate intent. 
B.  SOCEUR CASE STUDY 
1. Area Orientation 
EUCOM / SOCEUR’s AOR covers more than 21 million 
square miles and includes 93 countries and territories, 
extending from Norway through South Africa. This AOR 
includes the Baltic and Mediterranean seas, most of Europe, 
  44
parts of the Middle East and most of Africa.57 Whereas size 
and bilateral relationships were particular challenges for 
PACOM, EUCOM describes their challenges as diversity, 
conflict and change.58  
Located in Vaihingen, Germany, SOCEUR’s mission is to 
assume OPCON of all assigned or apportioned SOF in theater, 
and provides the capability of standing up and deploying a 
Joint Task Force headquarters (JTF) or a Joint Special 
Operations Task Force (JSOTF) headquarters.59 SOCEUR has 
assigned to it the 1st Battalion, 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne), located at Panzer Kaserne, Germany; Naval 
Special Warfare Unit Two also located at Panzer Kaserne, 
Germany; Naval Special Warfare Unit Ten, located at Rota, 
Spain; and the Air Force 352d Special Operations Group, 
located at RAF Mildenhall, United Kingdom.60 However, as 
with the case of SOCPAC, SOCEUR is apportioned in the JSCP 
the 3rd SFG(-) at FT Bragg, NC and the remainder of the 10th 
SFG at FT Carson, CO.  
It is interesting to note that the EUCOM theater has a 
large geographical overlap with the Central Command’s 
(CENTCOM) Areas of Interest (AOI). EUCOM’s AOR straddles 
CENTCOM’s in several unstable areas. The border areas of 
Turkey and Iraq or Libya and Egypt are examples of unstable 
areas that are split between the two theater commands. Both 
                     57 European Commands Public Website, Area of Responsibility, 
retrieved from http://www.eucom.mil/AOR/index.htm on 2 Mar 03. 
58 European Commands Public Website, Headquarters Command Staff, 
retrieved from http://www.eucom.mil/Command/index.htm on 2 Mar 03. 
59 Special Operations Forces Reference Manual, Joint Special 
Operations Forces Institue, January 1998, p2-5. 
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Europe (SOCEUR), retrieved from http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates 
/ECSO/index.htm on 2 Mar 03. 
Theater Commanders obviously have interests in stabilizing 
the regions between the two unified commands. Common 
interests and concerns have had an effect on engagement and 
engagement forces for SOCEUR. 3rd SFG provides an excellent 
example. 3rd SFG provides personnel support in accordance 
with the JSCP to both SOCs. However, all three battalions 
support standing engagement commitments in both theaters. 
Examples of this duel regional requirement can be seen by 
the support provided to both Desert Spring rotations in 
Kuwait and ACRI in Sub-Saharan Africa. The result of such 
peacetime engagement activities is SOF that are not 
properly regionally oriented because of the duel focus. 
The organization of SOCEUR is the same as SOCPAC, a 
Joint Staff with a command group and nine functional 
directorates. What is interesting to note is the location 
of SOCEUR compared to SOCPAC. SOCEUR is in a separate 
building situated down the street from its parent command, 
EUCOM. SOCPAC, on the other hand, is co-located in the same 
building with PACOM. Although this may seem a minor 
difference, it most assuredly affects coordination. 
2. SOCEUR’s Methodology 
EUCOM’s TEP planning process was established by EUCOM 
Directive 56-10 “Theater Security Planning System” and 
published in October of 1996. This directive does the same 
that PACOM Instruction 3010.7 does, in that it creates a 
complete planning system to meet the derived TEP 
requirements. The directive establishes a very top-down 
flow of policy decisions and tasks. Although the document  
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claims to create a system that “synchronizes and focuses 
theater efforts,” in actuality the process contradicts its 
purpose.61  
First, the process subdivides EUCOM into four sub-
regions which increases the challenge to synchronize 
activities across the entire theater. Second, engagement 
planning is combined with preparedness planning in the same 
process. Preparedness activities are, “directed at 
maintaining forces ready for the full spectrum of military 
operations”.62 The objectives of both types of activities, 
engagement and preparedness, are not always mutually 
supporting. Therefore, the products produced from the 
combined process must be somewhat less effective in each 
area. Finally, EUCOM utilizes a similar structure of 
regional and steering work groups as did PACOM. However, 
EUCOM holds each working group session only once to 
accomplish sub-regional planning, assessments, and to 
review these products prior to final approval. The effect 
of this limited group interaction will be discussed in the 
following section that evaluates EUCOM/SOCEUR’s handling of 
the three challenges of engagement planning.  
In terms of the first engagement planning challenge - 
unity of effort - EUCOM like PACOM, provided a commander’s 
intent statement. As with PACOM, the commander’s intent was 
supposed to provide the unifying philosophy for all forces. 
For SOCPAC the intent has been engagement activities are to 
support the standing OPLANs through influence and access. 
For SOCEUR the intent stated in EUCOM’s 1998 engagement 
                     61 EUCOM, “Directive 56-10 USEUCOM Theater Security Planning System,” 
October 1996, p.1. 
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strategy was to “promote stability and thwart aggression”.63 
This intent statement was too broad to have had any effect. 
The end result has been the creation of an activity matrix 
more diffuse among many nations and much less focused. This 
will soon be demonstrated through an analysis of engagement 
effectiveness. Second, the structure established in EUCOM 
directive 56-10 divides the staff’s efforts into sub-
regional groups and country desks which each produce 
separate strategies. Synchronization of these strategies 
takes place during one meeting of the steering group. This, 
too, seems to have contributed to the reduced effectiveness 
of the TEPs. 
EUCOM tackles the second challenge of synchronizing 
its efforts by using two systems. The first system is the 
working group concept discussed above. According to PACOM’s 
policy, their EWGs meet four times over the course of 
development for each TEP while EUCOM’s meets only once. The 
same is true for the senior group, EUCOM’s senior steering 
group meets only once compared to PACOM’s two review 
sessions. SOCEUR, as with SOCPAC, is represented in both 
forums. The membership of these two groups is also the same 
as with PACOM’s. Present at the working group sessions are 
country team representatives, theater component command 
staff representatives, sub-unified command staff 
representatives, and representatives of interested 
government agencies (primarily the State Department). But, 
just as with PACOM, all decisions and activities agreed to 
during the planning and steering group sessions are not 
binding on anyone outside EUCOM’s chain of command. Also, 
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the final authority to execute a mission in a given country 
rests with the ambassador and not the SOC or Regional 
Combatant Commander. What could provide additional 
synchronization would be the use of the MPPs and RPPs as 
the foundation for the development of the theater strategy. 
Unfortunately, SOCEUR views the country MPPs and regional 
RPPs simply as a reference source. So, no connection 
between the two strategies takes place, and like with 
SOCPAC, both organizations implement separate plans. 
The second tool used by EUCOM and SOCEUR is called the 
Theater Resource Apportionment Matrix (TRAM). This tool 
applies values to select attributes, such as regional 
priorities, counter-terrorism guidance, country strategic 
factors analysis (in other words a country’s ability to 
affect US objectives regionally), and a country’s activity 
priority. Each country is then scored on the extent to 
which engagement efforts are positively influencing that 
country. This scoring system drives the activities 
schedules for countries whose score needs to be improved. 
This same TRAM system not only drives the selection of 
activities, but it doubles as EUCOM’s and SOCEUR’s measure 
of effectiveness. The key to the matrix appears to be the 
value given to what EUCOM calls the ‘country strategic 
factors’. The category that relates to measuring 
effectiveness is called the Regional Objective Mapping 
(ROM) category. It basically rates “how well a country 
measures against regional objectives.”64 Unfortunately, the 
scoring of countries in this category is done subjectively 
by a staff officer weighing his perception of what the 
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status of a given country is against its PROs. Because the 
objectives are still broad without measurable supporting 
tasks the evaluation given in the TRAM is, in essence, an 
opinion. The answer to measuring effectiveness and 
producing aggregate gains was not achieved. 
3. Engagement Priorities 
The same methods of analysis employed in the PACOM 
case study which made use of NSS documents were employed to 
derive EUCOM’s prioritized country lists. Within EUCOM, 
unlike PACOM, the US is a member of several important 
multilateral organizations and commitments. Four 
commitments are mentioned in the NSS documents as important 
to engage with and support. The four are the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), Newly Independent States (NIS), 
the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the African Crisis 
Response Initiative (ACRI). However, for this evaluation, 
only countries named individually for engagement purposes 
are included in the following table. 
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 1998 1999 2000 2001 
BOSNIA & 
HERZEGOVINA BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA ALBANIA ALBANIA 
GREECE BULGARIA ALGERIA ALGERIA 
Nigeria DEM. REP OF CONGO ANGOLA BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA
POLAND ESTONIA BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA CZECH REPUBLIC 
RUSSIA GREECE BULGARIA ESTONIA 
SOUTH AFRICA HUNGARY CROATIA GREECE 
TURKEY LATVIA CZECH REPUBLIC HUNGARY 
UKRAINE LITHUANIA ESTONIA KOSOVO 
ZAIRE MACEDONIA GREECE LATVIA 
  POLAND HUNGARY LITHUANIA 
  ROMANIA KOSOVO MACEDONIA 
  RUSSIA LATVIA MONTENEGRO 
  SLOVENIA LITHUANIA MOROCCO 
  TURKEY MACEDONIA NIGERIA 
  SIERRA LEONE MOROCCO POLAND 
  UKRAINE NIGERIA RUSSIA 
  LIBERIA POLAND SLOVENIA 
  NIGERIA ROMANIA TUNISIA 
    RUSSIA TURKEY 
    SLOVENIA UKRAINE 
    SOUTH AFRICA   
    TUNISIA   
    TURKEY   
   UKRAINE   
Table 3.   Table of NSS Priority Countries for 
EUCOM/SOCEUR 
 
4. Effectiveness Analysis 
When looking at the total number of activities 
conducted, SOCEUR was deployed far more often than SOCPAC. 
On average, SOCEUR expended in excess of 27,000 more man-
weeks in its theater compared to SOCPAC.65 Without looking 
at any other numbers, one could conclude that more must be 
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better and that SOCEUR has to be considered effective at 
engagement because its units are in the field more. Also, 
according to the NSS documents covering the case study 
period, SOCEUR had a priority country list of eighteen 
countries on average. SOCPAC’s average priority list was 
ten. The effect of having a larger list should have 
increased the evaluated consistency ratio; just like 
shooting at a target, the larger the target is the easier 
it is to hit. Unfortunately, the larger target set did not 
help SOCEUR’s accuracy in terms of its consistency ratio. 
According to the deployment records at USSOCOM the 
following table reflects SOCEURs consistency ratios for the 
case study period. 
 
Table 4.   SOCEUR Consistency Ratios66 






Obviously, these numbers reflect a less than desirable 
level of consistency with the national guidance. Some could 
argue that EUCOM and SOCEUR was forced to spend deployment 
man-weeks supporting the four multilateral organizations 
ACRI, NIS, and PfP, and NATO. All four annual NSS documents 
mention their importance as well. And, if we reanalyze the 
consistency ratio to include all activities and all 
countries, including member countries of ACRI, NIS, PfP, 
and NATO (a total of 49 out of 91 countries) the ratio 
obviously does jump. In 1998, the total consistency ratio 
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jumps from 6.2% to 88.5%. But, the problem with doing this 
and applying this logic is that considering over half of 
the countries within a given AOR as a priority obviously 
destroys any meaning in the word ‘priority’. This also 
contradicts the desired endstate of EUCOMs Directive 56-10 
which states that EUCOM’s planning process, “focuses 
theater efforts and makes the best use of limited 
resources.”67  
As for aggregate gains, SOCEUR stands at about the 
same level as SOCPAC. Only 71 inquires were made via the 
SIPR net for SODARS reports on the missions executed in 
African countries.68 From a business perspective, SODARS 
potential consumers have let the producers know through 
their actions that the SODARS are a relatively worthless 
product. So, even the one tangible output from executed 
missions is not regarded as valuable or needed.  
Meanwhile, measuring the creation of access into 
countries as an aggregate gain for US interests is murky at 
best. The goal of creating access through habitual and 
professional relationships is difficult to guage. The 
degree of discernable interactivity and implied mutual 
respect does not necessarily translate into mutual support. 
Turkey offers an excellent example. Turkey is a key ally 
and received a great deal of US engagement support. That 
served the US well during the Cold War, but in the current 
stand off with Iraq, Turkey has denied access to basing of 
ground troops at a most critical time. This then forced a 
revision of operational plans and stranded the 4th ID on 
                     67 EUCOM, “Directive 56-10, USEUCOM Theater Security Planning 
System,” October 1996, p.1. 
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board ships in the Mediterranean Sea.69 At the same time, 
members of the NIS have provided political support to the 
US and its efforts against Iraq even in the midst of French 
condemnation for such support.70 These countries only began 
receiving US engagement support during the case study 
period. Nevertheless, not only have these small countries 
withstood French pressure, but as Latvia's Neatkariga Rita 
Avize responded to President Chirac criticisms, “we do not 
repay those who have helped us and who continue to help us 
with ingratitude.”71  Ten Eastern European countries, 
petitioning to enter the European Union (EU), signed a 
letter of support for US efforts against Iraq. All ten of 
these countries that did so regardless of French and German 
pressure just happened to have been priority engagement 
countries during the case study period and received 
significant engagement support. One can only conclude that 
the results of maintaining or obtaining access through 
engagement are ambiguous. However, because the potential 
for benefits through access does exist, engagement missions 
to attempt to gain access should not be ignored. 
C.  CONCLUSION 
Through the comparison of these two cases we gain some 
insights into the sort of methods that could render 
engagement more effective. First, both headquarters 
supplied a commander’s vision statement to focus the 
efforts of the subordinate commands. PACOM’s intent 
statement - that engagement supports regional OPLANs - 
seems to have provided the right focus. In contrast, 
                     69 BBC News, “No Easing of the Turkish Deadlock,” 4 March 2003. 
70 BBC, 'New Europe' backs EU on Iraq, 19 February 2003. 
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EUCOM’s intent, that engagement should promote stability 
and help prevent aggression, offers little in the way of 
specific focus.  
The use of working and steering groups is common 
between the two cases. However, because the consistency 
ratio is so much higher for SOCPAC we should conclude that 
one working group and one steering group meeting are not 
enough to address all issues or to synchronize activities 
well. The database system, TEMPIS, used by both 
headquarters may prove useful over time. It does provide a 
good system for cataloging executed and scheduled 
activities. It is a useful reference for all agencies 
involved, including the State Department, to review 
scheduled activities to ensure they mesh with the national 
interests in that region. But the fact that neither one of 
these devices - the meetings or the database system - 
compel all interested parties to live up to what was agreed 
upon, creates room for disunity. An example of such 
disunity can be found in Pakistan in 1998. The Clinton 
Administration imposed sanctions on military support for 
Pakistan following nuclear weapons testing while, at the 
same time, a JCET was still planned and executed there.72 
Thus, along with maintaining a robust working group system, 
it seems critical to develop a method for creating 
interagency ownership of the TEP.  
Finally, measuring effectiveness is always a difficult 
task when the objectives themselves tend to be ambiguous. 
The TEMPIS database provides an opportunity to enter 
evaluations, but only as subjective determinations. Also, 
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cataloging staff officer evaluations do not represent the 
ground truth of how well engagement objectives are being 
met. In the case of SOCPAC, evaluations were not even being 
added to some cases. During the research for this thesis I 
sampled Thailand’s evaluations from the PACOM database. No 
evaluations were found for the year 1999. This, of course, 
could be due to the fact this system was not required to be 
operational until 1 October 2001. The TRAM system seems to 
fit into the same category except additional subjective 
numerical scores are being applied to measure the 
engagement process. What appears to be needed is an 
objective list (PROs), provide by the National Command 
Authorities, which is measurable or verifiable from the 
onset. Understanding that this may not be feasible, the 
Theater Staffs and SOCs then have the responsibility to 
break down the PROs into assignable and measurable 
supporting tasks. These identified tasks then must be 
assigned to individual engagement activities for 
completion. With such a system in place objective measuring 
of effectiveness would be achieved.  
Chapter IV will build upon the lessons learned from 
the two cases studies and propose a set of principles for 
future SOF engagement planners. Africa will be used to test 
these principles and demonstrate their utility.  
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IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
A.  SUMMARY OF THE CASE STUDY RESULTS 
From the evaluation of the case studies, there are 
four principles that emerged to develop future TEPs. The 
first is the use of an intent statement that is relatively 
specific and capable of unifying all forces and agencies 
involved in that region’s engagement strategy. Second, the 
system of interagency working and steering groups must 
remain a part of the planning and synchronization process. 
However, they must hold multiple sessions throughout the 
four phases of a plan’s development to ensure good 
synchronization. Third, the TEPMIS database system for 
cataloging the history of engagement activities should be 
maintained and can be used as a means to synchronize the 
administrative process in preparing a TEP. However, it 
should not just be a system in which staff officer 
subjective judgments are entered. Staff officer evaluations 
should be part of such a data base, but supported with 
qualitative and quantitative information produced through 
effective engagement.  
The fourth principle falls out of the realm of what 
the SOC and Theater Staffs control. However, it is 
important for generating effective engagement. The number 
of countries listed as top priorities for engagement 
efforts must be kept to a minimum. It is not clear how much 
input the Regional Commander has in influencing which 
countries are listed as priorities in the national 
documents. However, the list should remain small, as was 
the case with PACOM during the case study period. 
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Additionally, the list should remain consistent over a long 
period. PACOM’s list remained 86.3 percent consistent from 
one year to the next.73  
From the case studies it is obvious that there are 
still some shortcomings in meeting all the challenges of 
the TEP process as well as with developing an effective 
TEP. The following section discusses possible solution to 
the remaining issues in TEP development.  
B.  FILLING THE GAPS IN THE TEP PROCESS 
There are three gapping holes in the TEP process and 
with effective engagement in general. First, to truly 
achieve unity of effort and synchronization of activities a 
sense of joint ownership of the engagement plan must be 
achieved among all agencies involved. Second, to ‘shape’ 
the region in accordance with the PROs, objectives must be 
broken down into assignable supporting tasks that can be 
objectively measured. Third, the strategy of engagement and 
its objectives and supporting tasks must change. We must 
move from a passive strategy expecting results through 
benevolent military exchanges to an aggressive one, 
actively preparing future battlefields.  
I will examine these shortcomings in reverse sequence 
addressing what I think is most degrading to effective 
engagement and to the security of the US. The logic behind 
the democratic peace hypothesis, which brought engagement 
policy to its current form, should no longer drive 
engagement. The present Global War on Terror requires a new 
and focused response using all instruments of statecraft.  
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To wage this new war a new mindset is required. The authors 
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui of Unrestricted Warfare, 
profess this new age of warfare and describe how to fight 
it. This Chinese People’s Liberation Army publication was 
conceived to demonstrate how to fight and win an 
asymmetrical war against the United States. However, the 
concept of asymmetrical warfare relates to the war the US 
wages now against an enemy of a different size, capability, 
organization, and motivation in our GWOT. According to 
Liang and Xiangsui, a nation will win “using all means, 
including armed force or nonarmed force, military and non-
military, and lethal and non-lethal means to compel the 
enemy to accept one's interests."74  In essence, we must 
focus all one’s national resources on the war effort not 
only during open hostilities, but more importantly, before 
the hostilities begin in order to set the conditions for 
success.  
The implication is that engagement can no longer be 
considered a concept by which we hope to shape an 
environment by rotating our presence around in a region, 
conducting training, and setting the example as a 
professional military. Also, this means that the different 
branches of government can no longer operate independently 
of each other, working off different strategies in the same 
region. Every resource committed abroad for engagement must 
have a specific purpose and together must contribute to 
achieving unilateral gains toward our strategic interests. 
To  accomplish  these  tasks, forces  proactively operating 
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abroad must seek to obtain information. We must also 
carefully position our forces and establish operational 
support bases.  
SOF can play a major role in this new style of 
engagement as it did during the last decade. SOF has the 
capability to prepare future battlefields both by 
collecting information, but also by conducting operational 
preparation of the battlefield. Collection of information, 
establishing evasion support networks, or sowing the seeds 
of support from indigenous organizations for the US is all 
possible. In other words, SOF should employ the 
unconventional warfare talents that it was founded on, but 
doing it during engagement operations. In a statement 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General 
Holland, Commander of SOCOM, discussed the Operational 
Preparation of the Battlefield (OPB) and augmentation of 
global intelligence as the means for deterring future 
threats.75 By acting as an advanced scouting force, SOF, 
through engagement will have the ability to shape the 
operational environment. The aim will not be to generate 
good will and foster international relations alone.  
Engagement will also lay a foundation that all elements of 
statecraft can use to secure US interests. 
To accomplish this big shift, a change in the way 
prioritized regional objectives are derived, broken down, 
and tasked out must occur. This is the second shortcoming 
in the TEP process that must be fixed. The fact that 
supporting tasks for engagement PROs are not assigned to 
deploying units is unconscionable. To operationalize the 
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new engagement philosophy, every mission tasking order 
issued to a unit for conducting an engagement activity must 
include unilateral tasks. These tasks must be designed to 
generate an expected return of information or the 
positioning of resources to shape the region to support 
possible contingencies. In other words, what I am 
advocating is a two-fold change involving the assessment 
phase and the Activity Matrix development phases. First, 
during the assessment phase, not only should regional and 
country engagement objectives and supporting tasks be 
identified, but a country-specific PIR list should be 
created and maintained. Second, during the creation of the 
matrix of engagement missions the SOC should then develop a 
collection plan and assign specific PIR to be collected 
during specific missions. 
To bring about joint ownership in the TEP and really 
synchronize efforts in the theater, the final and complete 
TEP must be an interagency plan. It must be binding to all 
US government agencies involved in a given theater. The 
process already involves all agencies and departments of 
the government. Yet, upon completion of the collaboration 
on a TEP, the separate departments of the government return 
to their offices and function off their own separate 
strategies. To combat the transnational actors in this GWOT 
the tools of the military, diplomacy, finances and 
information must all be focused on the same objectives.  
Now, incorporating these principles I present the 
following  modified  TEP  process. This   pocess takes into 
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account all seven items and goes a long way towards 
changing the strategy of engagement from a passive to an 
active approach. 
C.  THE PROPOSED TEP PROCESS 
 By no means does the entire system need to be 
completely recreated. The following matrix depicts the 
proposed flow of activities to achieve an effective 
engagement plan. As you can quickly see, the procedure 
remains a four phase process conducted through working 
groups and reviewed by steering groups. 
Table 5.   Proposed TEP Flow Chart 
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Phase Required Input Actions Conducted Output 
Phase 1. 1. National Security Strategy 
2. National Military Strategy 
3. DoS Strategic Plan 
4. Treasury Strategic Plan 
5. National Engagement Plan 
6. CPG 
7. JSCP  
8. Applicable DoS Bureau 
Performance Plans 
Interagency Working Group (IWG) 
1. Reviews nat. strategy docs 
2. Conducts regional/ country  
   assessments 
3. Develops PIR lists for the  
   regional and individual  
   countries 
1. Regional/country 
assessments  
2. PIR lists 
3. Prioritized country 
list  
Phase 2. 1. Assessments from Phase 1. 
2. PIR Lists 
3. Regional policy documents 




1. Develop supporting task 
lists for all regional 
prioritized objectives and 
assign to appropriate agencies 
2. Create interagency strategic 
concept for region. 
3. Develop resource concept 
Senior Steering Group (SSG) 
4. Develop agency specific 
annexes detailing their portion 
of the engagement concept  
1. Review strategic concept 
2. Submit to CJCS for approval  
1. Interagency 
Strategic Concept 
2. Supporting tasks 
list 
3. Unifying Engagement 
Intent issued 
Phase 3. 1. Interagency Strategic 
Concept 
2. Supporting Task lists 
3. PIR Lists 
4. Engagement Intent 
IWG #2: 
1. Identify engagement 
activities 
2. Resource requirement fully 
developed 
3. Collection Plan mapped to 
engagement activities matrix 
and assigned as additional 
tasks 
SSG#2 
1. Review matrix, resourcing, 
collection plan 
2. Submit complete TEP to CJCS 
for approval 




3. measurable and 
identifiable 
supporting tasks 
4. PIR lists and 
collection plan 
mapped out to 
missions 
Phase 4. 1. Completed TEP CJCS 
1. Review TEP 
2. Integrate TEP into Global 
Family of Plans 
3. Global Family Of Plans 







 Before going through the details of the proposed TEP 
process, it is important to note a few general conceptual 
changes. The emphasis of the working groups must change. 
These groups can no longer be military working groups open 
to interagency suggestions and information but must become 
actual interagency working groups. The lead agency should 
be the military due to the fact they will shoulder 
executing the majority of the engagement activities. As was 
suggested earlier, the outcomes and decisions derived from 
these working and steering groups is to be binding on all 
agencies involved. In essence, this process should 
complement the interagency policy coordination committees 
(PCCs) with an interagency plan to achieve the desired 
policies.76 According to Élan French, head of the African 
Securities Bureau, the current intent of DoS involvement 
with the regional commander’s theater engagement plans is 
only to prevent conflicting DoS and DoD activities.77 
Through true interagency planning, a better goal of actual 
synchronized efforts can be achieved. The process from 
start to finish would then be integrated among all agencies 
involved in regional engagement. 
 I will now review the proposed TEP flow chart and how 
this implements the effective principles exposed during the 
case study analysis. During the first phase of the TEP 
process we employ the first principle of limiting the set 
of priority countries in which to engage. In this modified 
TEP process, a review and a consensus is obtained from the 
                     76 LTC Kevin Kenny DoS African Security Affairs Bureau personal 
conversation, 31 March 03.   
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77 Élan French DoS African Security Affairs Bureau personal 
conversation, 31 March 03.   
interagency working group on the list of priority countries 
during the assessment phase. Next, an effective commander’s 
intent for the engagement plan should be developed and 
issued to the group to also unify the effort. Finally, in 
conjunction with assessing each country’s status, a list of 
PIRs should be generated to develop a better understanding 
of the disposition of each country in relation to US 
interests. As for the assessment of country-specific 
progress, the assignment of specific tasks to engagement 
activities during Phase Three should be of assistance. When 
a unit performs a specific supporting task for an 
engagement PRO or collects a certain PIR the progress can 
be charted and recorded. In essence, assessment must by 
based on identifiable objectives accomplished along with 
the more subjective ranking of countries based on a 
relative measure of a country’s abilities to affect US 
interests. To capture and record this progress, the TEPMIS 
database system is more than adequate. By recording the 
accomplishment of specified tasks instead of relying on 
subjective judgments, the analysis of country progress 
should be more accurate. 
 During Phase Two, change must be made to the 
production of the regional engagement strategy. As already 
discussed, this strategy must change from a military to an 
interagency one and from passive to active. There should be 
additional annexes specific to each agency, including one 
for the regional military forces. This forces consensus on 
the long-term strategy for the region, and demonstrates how 
each important agency is involved. The second important 
change to this part of the process is the development of 
supporting unilateral tasks. Part of the difficulty in 
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producing and measuring aggregate gains begins with the 
national documents that issue vague objectives that cannot 
be broken down into supporting tasks and then measured. It 
is important to change the method by which national 
strategy documents on engagement are conceived in 
Washington DC. This, however, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. Nevertheless, with the guidance and objectives that 
are issued to that Interagency Working Group (IWG), the 
working group must develop specific unilateral supporting 
tasks that can be assigned and measured during the next 
cycle of assessment. With the mindset that the US is in a 
state of war against terrorists, then the tasks derived 
must reflect that. For SOF, the tasks derived should focus 
on utilizing their UW and special operations skills to 
collect information, work with indigenous personnel, and 
interdict select targets. 
 Phase Three still focuses on the development of a 
matrix listing all engagement activities. The development 
of the Activity Matrix must begin to weave together the 
activities of all agencies and how the interaction of the 
different agencies will be mutually beneficial and 
supporting. Also, the supporting tasks derived in Phase Two 
are assigned to activities scheduled in the matrix during 
this phase. Here is when the SOC must apply General 
Holland’s concept of SOF as global scouts, conducting 
operational and informational preparation of the 
battlefield. As scouts, the SOC must assign SOF elements 
sparingly to engagement activities, but when applied they 
must have specific unilateral objectives. These 
unconventional   unilateral   objectives   would   then  be 
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accomplished in a sensitive manner while meeting the 
overarching training mission objectives of military-to-
military exchanges. 
 The Fourth Phase of review and approval by the CJCS 
remains unchanged. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis, common sense dictates that if the regional strategy 
document changed to an interagency strategy document the 
review process in Washington, DC would have to change as 
well. 
D.  APPLIED TO AFRICA 
The intent of this portion of the thesis is to apply 
the modified TEP process to a portion of West Africa. The 
outcome will be hypothetical, but illustrative. There are 
three reasons that make this an appropriate and tough test 
of the revised TEP process. First, the importance of 
shaping Africa favorable to US security interests has grown 
tremendously in the light of the staging and movement of 
transnational terrorists, weapons, and drugs through the 
continent. Second, the instability in the region, created 
as a result of the colonial period and continued by the 
superpowers, presents a difficult challenge for engagement 
planners. Third, effective US engagement with Africa has 
the greatest possible return on US investment. The possible 
outcomes include stability, access to important regions to 
preempt possible threats, and the opening up of a large 
market currently not well exploited by the US. 
1. Engagement with a Priority Country 
This hypothetical test will examine the outcome of our 
engagement strategy toward Nigeria were we to apply my 
modified TEP approach. The process would start out with the 
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IWG reviewing the national and agency-relevant documents. 
Currently, President Bush’s policy toward Africa is 
comprised of his strategic approach, policy priorities, and 
bilateral engagement.78 His strategy is to work with the key 
anchor states in each sub-region, which he has identified 
as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia.79 He conveys 
the same message in his National Security Strategy.80 In the 
2002 Department of State Foreign Military Training and DoD 
Engagement Activities of Interest: Joint Report to 
Congress, the DoS characterizes Nigeria as a fragile 
democratic state. Recent events in Nigeria support that 
claim. Nigeria has the largest population and military in 
Africa. It is a key oil supplier to the US and has a great 
deal of influence in West Africa. But, the government only 
recently changed in 1999 from a dictatorship to a popular 
democracy. Currently, DoS advocates a two-pronged 
engagement program of professionalization of Nigeria’s 
neglected military and the nurturing of its fledgling 
democracy through education at the African Center for 
Strategic Studies (ACSS).81 The Department of the Treasury 
also identifies with the need to assist in Africa. 
According to the Treasury’s Strategic Plan, assisting with 
economic  growth,  “is  necessary  to  reduce  poverty  and 
                     78 President Bush’s African policy, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
infocus/], 2 April 2003. 
79 Ibid. 
80 President Bush, National Security Strategy, September 2002, p. 11. 
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81 DoS 2002 Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities 
of Interest: Joint Report to Congress, section III. 
provide opportunity in these nations (and) can further 
regional stability, and advance democracy and the rule of 
law”.82  
Nigeria, like all other African countries, can be 
divided along tribal, ethnic and religious lines. These 
differences have created rifts, which are exploited by 
domestic figures as well as transnational organizations. 
The primary ethnic groups are the Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, and 
Hausa there is a long history of differential development 
within the country.83 One major indication of the fissures 
present is the adaptation of Sharia Law in some northern 
Nigerian states causing Christian Nigerians to flee to 
other states.84 Nigeria has a massive crime problem mainly 
in trafficking drugs to all parts of the world, including 
the US.85 The criminal element launders money and provides a 
safe haven for the international traffickers it employs. To 
this day there remain border disputes in the tri-tip area 
of Nigeria, Niger, Benin, as well as in the Lake Chad 
Basin.  
The outcome of Phase One would most likely lead to 
some of the following conclusions. First, Nigeria has to be 
considered a priority engagement country. As was mentioned 
earlier, I cannot speculate on what assessment could have 
been made of the previous engagement programs, but I 
believe the group would note the active interest Nigeria 
                     82 Department of the Treasury Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2000-
2005, p26. 
83 “Art and Life in Africa, Nigeria Information,” 
[http://www.uiowa.edu/~africart/toc/countries/Nigeria.html], 3 April 
2003. 
84 BBC, “Country Profile: Nigeria,” dated 6 March 2003. 
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85 “2002 CIA World Fact Bookm -  Nigeria,” [http://www.cia.gov/cia/ 
publications/factbook/index.html], 3 March 2003. 
demonstrated toward working with US forces during Operation 
Focused Relief (OFR). The interest of Nigeria to conduct 
bilateral engagement activities suggests a relationship 
capable of being further developed. In basic terms, the IWG 
would conclude that Nigeria is an important strategic 
partner for the US. It is important because of the size of 
its military, the oil it provides, and the influence it has 
with its neighbor states. However, it is also important to 
the US because of strong ties to international criminal 
elements and thus quite possibly to international 
terrorists. With this in mind, the IWG could refine the 
objectives for Nigeria and generate an impressive list of 
PIR. The highlights of the information requests would focus 
on criminal drug trafficking and money laundering, 
government corruption, and Muslim extremists. There is no 
need to go into the detailed questions that could be asked. 
It is simply important to understand that PIR would be 
generated which could be easily observed by SOF “global 
scouts” or other government assets, and reported following 
any engagement mission in country. 
The strategy that would be developed would be very 
robust, involving all the instruments of statecraft. The 
strategy would need to look out over eight years which 
would align the strategy to the current planning 
requirements for the Activity Matrix portion of the TEP.86 
More importantly, the strategy should define the long-term 
desired endstate of our targeted priority countries. The 
strategy must address what reasonably can be expected to be 
accomplished by each agency in those eight years and 
illustrate how the efforts of one agency will be reinforced 
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or built upon by others. For Nigeria, it can be assumed 
that the strategy would be comprised of three primary 
efforts. The first effort would be led by both the 
Department of Justice and the Department of Treasury. The 
long term objective would be to raise the capability and 
professionalism of the national police force and its 
investigating arm, while developing informants already 
inside the criminal cartels for future exploitation. The 
desired endstate would be for Nigerian law enforcement to 
be capable of and willing to effectively enforcing the 
national laws and to develop methods to monitor and thwart 
international criminal and terrorist activity.  
The second effort would be led by the Department of 
State and the objective would be to bolster the newly 
established democratic government. Concurrently, the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) would also run a program 
to determine the extent of Muslim extremist influence in 
national and regional government, and attempt to isolate 
it. The defined endstate would be successful and consistent 
democratic elections and extremist Muslim influences 
identified and reduced. The information collected on such 
extremists obviously would get fed back into the PIR 
collection plan for future exploitation.  
The third effort of engagement would be led by the 
Department of Defense and the objective would be the 
professionalization of the officer and NCO training cadre. 
The desired endstate would be a training cadre established 
that is capable of training and sustaining the Nigerian 
Military forces. Concurrently, the unilateral objective of 
DoD engagement would be the targeting of transnational 
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terrorists, their support networks, basing, and weapons 
shipments. By targeting I mean locating, identifying, and 
destroying members and resources of the transnational 
terrorist networks either through host nation surrogate 
forces, unilaterally, or a combination of forces. 
From the strategy conceived in the Second Phase it is 
easy to see how specific supporting tasks could be 
generated to accomplish these engagement objectives. Based 
on the strategy, objectives, and PIR, the SOC should then 
participate in the development of the Activities Matrix to 
schedule missions that effectively employ SOF. The SOC 
could generate specific information collection tasks to 
counter the drug and weapons trafficking operations or the 
hosting of transnational terrorists. Unconventional warfare 
tasks of developing indigenous networks could be identified 
to support direct interventions by Host Nation forces, 
other US government agencies or US SOF elements. 
Most importantly, the product of the Third Phase of 
planning is an Activity Matrix that weaves all agencies 
efforts in Nigeria together. The list of scheduled 
activities includes the supporting tasks to be accomplished 
by each mission assigned. The Fourth Phase of reviewing the 
completed TEP back in Washington, D.C. should be 
accomplished through an interagency process. The final 
approval of the plan should be accomplished by a body that 
has senior interagency policy decision authority, like the 
National Security Council. Again, this is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, but the change in the approval process is 
logical if the nature of the document has changed. 
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Finally, it is important to note that the process is 
cyclical and does not end with the approval of a TEP. One 
of the seven principles identified as necessary for 
effective engagement is the employment of multiple sessions 
of the different interagency working groups. The reason for 
this is not only to synchronize activities during the 
creation of a TEP, but it is also to constantly reevaluate 
the status of the program and measure its progress.  
2. Engagement with a Non-priority Country 
The country of Mali offers another hypothetical test 
case for how the US should engage with a non priority 
country that seeks US support. Because Mali is not one of 
the countries the President wants to focus on, the 
challenge is to maintain positive relations with Mali and 
take advantage of any opportunities to continue the GWOT 
with minimal resource expenditure.  
The review and assessment in Phase One of the planning 
will highlight the condition of Mali. Mali is one of four 
countries in the Sahara-Sahel region, and is one of the 
world’s poorest countries. It was part of the French 
colonial empire. French is still the language of government 
and business, and France is still Mali’s primary trading 
partner.87 The country is predominantly Muslim and is 
subdivided by 12 dominant tribes with “little sense of 
national belonging.”88 A large portion of the population is 
semi-nomadic and the remainder are agriculturalists in the 
Niger River delta. These facts would lead the IWG to 
conclude the democratic government of Mali only has limited 
                     87 Charles Stansfield and Chester Zimolzak, Global Perspectives: A 
World Regional Geography, 1990, p.552. 
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influence and control over many of its people. The outcome 
from this situation would be to view Mali as a potential 
support base for Muslim extremists and their transnational 
terrorist brethren.  
The assessment of previous engagement activities 
without the benefit of this modified TEP process could only 
be regarded as weak at best. During the crisis period in 
1998 in Sierra Leone, Mali volunteered to be a member of 
the OFR program which was designed to prepare African 
forces to intervene in the Sierra Leone crisis. This 
demonstrated Mali’s interest in being an active force in 
stabilizing its region and thwarting extremism. For 
whatever reason, Mali was not allowed to participate and 
instead the JCS exercise FLINTLOCK 98 was planned and 
executed in Mali. The US message to the Malian government 
must have appeared to have been a judgment that the Malian 
forces were inadequate or unwanted. This is not the way to 
get a dominant Muslim country with weak government control 
to support US security concerns. 
Obviously, the PIR list derived to help develop a 
better understanding of Mali and the factors at play would 
be extensive. The focus would be the Muslim society and 
different internal allegiances. Information would be sought 
on connections to extremists within the different tribes. 
Because the assets dedicated to engagement with Mali would 
be limited, great effort would be needed to prioritize the 
information requirements so the most critical information 
is obtained first.  
The strategy of engagement with Mali, developed in 
Phase Two, should attempt to minimize committed resources 
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to Mali while attempting to provide the maximum benefits to 
both Mali, and most importantly, the US. A great number of 
Mali’s internal challenges stem from how poor the country 
is. Following the establishment of democracy in 1991, 
considerable effort has been made to reform the economy. To 
continue strengthening Mali’s economy while building mutual 
trust and commitment seems best served by economic 
engagement. This conserves military forces and their 
OPTEMPO while maintaining access to the country. To 
compensate for limited military-to-military contacts in 
Mali, Mali should receive an increase in allocations of 
IMET student positions. SOF missions should continue on a 
very limited basis through any of the SOF engagement 
programs looking for intelligence preparation of the 
battlefield.  
For Mali, the Activity Matrix conceived would be less 
intricate than Nigeria’s but no less important. Because the 
activities are fewer, those activities must be more 
productive for both parties. The strategy of helping 
develop the economy should be capitalized on by all 
agencies. For SOF, SMEEs could be scheduled to develop 
Mali’s ability to secure critical infrastructure that 
supports its economy. While deployed on such missions, the 
unilateral tasks to collect information could take place.  
Obviously, the intensity of the Nigerian and Mali 
programs would be vastly different. However, if they are 
both effectively executed the benefits for US security 
interest and the Global War on Terror will be felt across 
the region. Reports by US officials and other governments 
continue to point to heavy weapons smuggling in the Sahel 
  74
region, and in Nigeria. Understanding the traffic flow 
across the entire region is necessary if the US really 
intends to impact them.  
In the existing conditions in Africa, effective 
action to control arms flows and availability 
requires determined, comprehensive and co-
ordinated action at not only the local and 
national levels but also at the level of the 
African sub-regions and the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU).89  
E.  CONCLUSION 
What can be concluded from this exercise is that by 
applying this modified TEP process a more integrated, 
measurable and effective engagement strategy can be 
produced. Most importantly, the strategy is shifted from a 
passive individual effort to an aggressive team effort. The 
Bush administration seems to agree in spirit with what I am 
espousing: We cannot engage abroad in an uncoordinated 
fashion with every nation that is simply willing to consume 
US currency and resources. I infer this based on President 
Bush’s African policy of creating, “coalitions of the 
willing… countries with major impact on their neighborhood 
such as South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia”.90 Any 
plan worth execution must synchronize all agency efforts in 
order to bear real fruit. The objectives to be obtained 
must be specified. For SOF, those objectives must relate to 
tasks issued to them in the task order sending them 
overseas to do things such as collect information to 
support unilateral US security interests.  
                     89 Editorial, Small Arms Proliferation and Africa, Institute for 
Security Studies, accessed on 21 April 2003, from http://www.iss.co.za 
/Pubs/Newsletters/OAU/OAUISS1.html. 
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A.  THE SUSTAINED IMPORTANCE OF ENGAGEMENT   
This thesis provides a methodical way to approach what 
is the most important element of our national security 
strategy, engagement. No change to the importance of this 
strategy appears to, or should, be expected in the near 
future. The Commander of the Air Force Special Operations 
Command (AFSOC), Lt. Gen. Hester, concurs, stating that 
engagement will continue to be the priority for the 
future.91 With this in mind, the importance of effective 
engagement planning has increased, and thus the discoveries 
of this thesis deserve careful review. 
From this thesis the reader should first have a good 
understanding of what engagement and engagement activities 
really are. They are, again: pre-planned activities which 
are multilateral, long-term, and focused on US interests. 
These characteristics define engagement and necessitate 
effective planning for obvious reasons. Simply stated, if 
we are to synchronize multiple activities involving 
multiple agencies, schedule them far in advance, and 
coordinate them with foreign governments, an effective plan 
is required. 
Unfortunately, my evaluation of the case studies 
presented indicates that current engagement planning 
systems do not generate the effective plan that is needed. 
There are three primary challenges to engagement planning. 
These are: unity of effort, synchronization, and generating 
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/ evaluating aggregate gains. Without mastering these 
challenges a coherent strategy is not possible.  
The case of creating unity of effort is not just a 
joint military problem; it is an interagency problem. This 
is because all four elements of statecraft are involved in 
engagement. At the heart of this interagency coordination 
problem are political, ideological, and organizational 
differences. The DoS and DoD, the two primary engagement 
actors, seem to be the most ideologically opposed. 
Currently, with the cessation of open hostilities in Iraq, 
a public power struggle between the DoS and DoD is 
underway. This is a struggle over which department should 
have the lead in US foreign policy, and thereby controls 
engagement policy.92 At the theater level, these differences 
have devastating results. The results of the interagency 
problem have led Phil Keorle, of the US Joint Forces 
Command to describe theater level interagency planning as 
the “least effective.”93 Even worse, at present, the result 
of the interagency planning efforts for engagement produce 
only a military plan and not an interagency plan. 
Government agencies still generate separate engagement 
strategies. 
As one of the three pillars of US military strategy, 
it is unacceptable to leave engagement as the least 
effectively planned pillar. This thesis proposes a TEP 
process that addresses the challenges of theater engagement 
planning by changing the paradigms on which it was founded. 
                     92Kessler, Glenn, “State-Defense Policy Rivalry Intensifying”, 
Washington Post, April 22, 2003, p1. 
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First, engagement cannot be preplanned and executed 
separately by each government agency. Second, engagement 
cannot be passive. Finally, the decision to commit 
significant US resources must be made with expected returns 
from each and every operation. These returns should be 
programmed to build on one another. The aggregate effect of 
these accomplishments would then eventually lead to the 
achievement of long-term regional objectives. 
For SOF involved in today’s GWOT, this means engaging 
abroad as global scouts. SOCs should sustain the current 
type of engagement activities, but assign unilateral tasks 
to SOF units conducting them. These unilateral tasks are 
for the operational and informational preparation of the 
battlefield for the GWOT. With the combination of 
multilateral engagement activities, and additional 
unilateral taskings for the GWOT, we maximize SOF’s 
capabilities and the utility of engagement activities. As 
the supported Unified Command, for the GWOT, maximizing 
SOCOMs effectiveness is exactly what is needed in light of 
an increasing OPTEMPO and diminishing resources. Therefore, 
each SOC has a vested interest in making the TEP process 
work effectively for both the good of US security, as well 
as, for the good of SOF. 
To accomplish the required paradigm shift and increase 
overall effectiveness, seven identified principles for TEP 
planning need to be applied. They are: 
• Publish a clear, unifying intent from the Theater 
Command and communicate it to all supporting 
organizations. 
• Plan with interagency working groups that meet 
multiple times throughout the TEP cycle. 
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• Sustain the TEMPIS database to catalog activities 
and chart results. 
• Keep the list of priority countries small and 
consistent for several years at a time. 
• Publish an interagency TEP that is binding on all 
agencies involved. 
• Develop supporting tasks for all PROs that are 
measurable and actually assigned them to 
preplanned activities. 
• Transition engagement strategy from passive to 
one that is active.   
 
The proposed TEP process in this thesis strives to 
incorporate these principles into the existing TEP 
framework. The reason for this is to take advantage of 
existing programs in order to minimize disruption. 
B.  PERCEIVED DANGERS 
Shifting away from the established patterns will be 
difficult and could have negative repercussions on US 
foreign policy. As alluded to earlier, the power struggle 
between DoS and DoD challenges basic policy coordination 
and decisions. To propose that the Theater Engagement Plan 
evolve from a military product with interagency 
cooperation, to an actual interagency plan might seem 
impossible. However, it is no longer acceptable for the DoS 
and DoD to conduct interagency coordination on a TEP only 
in order to prevent conflicting actions. The goal must be 
more ambitious. The objective of the TEP process must be to 
create an interagency strategy that synergizes efforts and 
truly shapes the theater to our advantage in the Global War 
on Terror as well as support US interests beyond the GWOT. 
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The danger to US foreign policy lies in the discovery 
by foreign countries that US SOF, while deployed on 
seemingly innocuous engagement deployments, are also 
collecting information. Or, these countries may not approve 
of SOF forces that are present for an exercise being 
retasked to interdict a target somewhere else in the 
region. This may give the impression that the host nation 
was used as a pre-planned staging base for other 
operations, and the combined exercise was only a ruse. The 
results, if such impressions are made, could obviously be 
damaging to international relations and the policy of 
engagement in general. 
I disagree, however, that these fears justify failing 
to adopt the proposed changes to TEP planning and strategy. 
First, in regard to collecting information while abroad, an 
aggressive engagement strategy does not create a new hazard 
to US foreign relations. Other military-to-military 
programs currently collect information with forces deployed 
abroad. One such program is the Defense Attaché program. 
One of the primary missions of the Defense Attaché program 
is, “(1) collecting and reporting military and military-
political information.94” This is stated openly in the 
public record. The Defense Intelligence Agency is in charge 
of the DATT program and uses this information along with 
other intelligence to support the needs of DoD decision 
makers. Even though this information is common knowledge 
throughout the world, no ill effects on US foreign 
relations have been incurred. 




It is also no surprise to US officials that allies 
collect information on American industry and the U.S. 
military. According to ABC News, “Japan, Israel, France, 
South Korea and Taiwan are highlighted (in a report to 
Congress) as some of the most aggressive in attempting to 
obtain U.S. business information, through lawful and/or 
illegal means.95” Most information sought is of military 
importance, but alleged conspirators are rarely prosecuted 
and damage to foreign relations between the US and those 
countries have, obviously, not suffered. Therefore, 
thoughtful use of SOF abroad to conduct intelligence 
preparation of the battlefield to fight the GWOT should be 
no different. 
Finally, the retasking of US forces, while abroad in 
one country, to interdict a target in another is not 
without precedent. Arguably, the forward-deployed forces of 
the US military during the Cold War were positioned to 
respond rapidly across borders to defend US security 
interests. The concept of maintaining a forward US military 
presence is to stop problems before they can really start. 
That is what this thesis proposes for how SOF can 
operationally prepare battle spaces in the GWOT. There are, 
also, examples of SOF repositioning abroad while training. 
SOF forces conducting combined training in the Republic of 
Congo in March of 1997 were retasked to prepare for the 
Noncombatant  Evacuation  (NEO) of  American  and  Canadian 
                     95 David Ruppe, “Friends Spying on Friends: Washington Lists Allies 




citizens from Brazzaville, Congo. The operation never took 
place, but the rationale for using capable forces already 
in the region is not new. 
C.  CURRENT TRENDS 
Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, has called for 
a change in engagement strategy. As confirmed by LT Gen 
Hester, Mr. Rumsfeld has called for a transition of DoD 
policy, from Theater Engagement to Theater Security 
Cooperation.96 Secretary Rumsfeld has created a new document 
which will become the parent of future Theater Security 
Cooperation Plans (Theater Engagement Plans renamed). 
Entitled simply ‘Security Cooperation Guidance,’ this DoD 
document takes steps toward issuing specific regional 
objectives that are capable of being broken down and 
measured. Unfortunately, it is solely a DoD initiative and 
was not constructed as an interagency strategy. According 
to COL Welsh, of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 
Strategy, the draft was shown to the State Department after 
it was completed.97 As a consequence, the advantages created 
by more thorough guidance will be negated by this lack of 
interagency coordination and synchronization. 
For the SOF community, the designation of SOCOM as the 
supported command to conduct the Global War on Terror has 
changed the SOF mindset on engagement. The changes that are 
taking place and their associated activities are 
classified. However, the intent of those changes can be 
characterized by Lt. GEN Hester’s comment on the new 
engagement focus. He foresees engagement in general, and 
                     96 Briefing presented by, LT GEN Paul Hester, Commander AFSOC, to 
SOLIC curriculum NPS, April 23, 2003 
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the JCET program in particular as evolving into a “more 
robust program in light of the GWOT.98” This gives us hope 
that the SOF community will lead the way in creating a more 
aggressive engagement program. 
D.  KEY REMAINING QUESTION 
 In the upcoming decade, Special Operation Forces will 
likely maintain the current OPTEMPO if not increase it. 
Developing and sustaining the national militaries in 
Afghanistan and Iraq will require continual deployments of 
US SOF. The GWOT will remain a central focus for SOCOM, 
demanding significant resources. This leaves little 
manpower available to conduct peacetime engagement even 
though, as stated earlier, it remains one of the three 
pillars of our national military strategy. Yet how can we 
continue with this policy of engagement in light of so many 
commitments?  
 One solution may be in the permanent forward 
deployment of SOF and restructuring overseas basing of US 
forces. By positioning forces in areas where the US has 
never before maintained a presence could provide great 
engagement opportunities. The US could develop new regional 
partners, and inject US funds into deserving and developing 
economies, while taking the GWOT to where the enemy lives. 
The current forward deployed basing is primarily a result 
of World War II, the Korean War, and the Cold War. There is 
discussion about the repositioning of forward-deployed 
basing to the Middle East as a result of Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. Further research will be needed to determine where 
new US military outposts might be located to best attain 
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curriculum at NPS, April 23, 2003. 
advantages with Geopolitical positioning, supporting 
strategic military considerations, as well as, enhance our 
capability to prosecute the GWOT. 
 The 21st century is full of uncertainty. The 
stabilizing effect of a bipolar world is gone and regional 
instability is rampant. The decision to address instability 
with US engagement abroad is sound. But, for the US to meet 
commitments abroad, maintain US security, and shape the 
global environment a good plan is needed. Effective 
engagement requires that all agencies work together, 
synchronize their efforts, and aggressively pursue US 
security interests. This is the only way to prevent current 
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